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Abstract:  This is an ambitious attempt to view the relationships involving education and income 
as forming a system, and one that can generate a poverty trap. The setting is rural China, and the 
data are from a national household survey for 2002, designed with research hypotheses in mind. 
Enrolment is high in rural China by comparison with most poor rural societies, but the quality of 
education varies greatly. There are three main strands to the paper. One examines the 
determinants of enrolment, and finds that poverty has an adverse effect on both the quality and 
quantity of education - so contributing to a poverty trap. The second examines the effects of 
education. It shows how and why the returns to education vary according to household and 
community income – so also contributing to a poverty trap. The third strand brings no fewer than 
17 estimated relationships together as a system, and poses the question: can education break the 
vicious circle of poverty? The implications for poverty analysis and for educational policy are 
considered. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This research project falls within the DfID-funded Research Consortium on Educational 
Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP). It exploits an existing data set, which was partly designed 
with our research questions in mind. It can be seen as a prototype for research on the four 
countries on which the Programme is concentrating: India, Pakistan, Kenya and Ghana. The most 
interesting comparative study, at a later stage of the Programme, would be of China with its giant 
counterpart, India: rural China has much higher educational attainment and also enrolment than 
does rural India, and an analysis of the reasons for, and consequences of, this difference would 
be instructive. 
 
China provides an appropriate case study on the relationships between education and poverty. By 
comparison with the rural areas of the four countries that are being examined in depth within the 
programme, rural China provides better educational access, certainly at the primary level, 
probably at the secondary level, and possibly at the tertiary level. However, there is a wide 
variation in both the quantity and quality of educational provision, by province, by county and by 
village. This variation reflects the decentralised system by which public education is funded. 
Poor areas are at a disadvantage. Moreover, if the general marketisation of the Chinese economy 
has meant that school fees and charges have become more important, the educational access of 
poor rural households, even within a village, may have deteriorated, at least in relative terms and 
possibly in absolute terms. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to show that education and poverty are closely related in 
numerous ways, and that the interactions among a set of poverty-related and education-related 
variables are capable of generating a vicious circle of educational deprivation and poverty, and 
also a virtuous circle of positive interaction between education and income. The web of 
hypothesised relationships is estimated empirically for rural China, and the nature of the resultant 
poverty trap is captured. Their complexity and simultaneous determination in an interrelated 
system, together with the cross-section nature of our data set, makes it difficult to establish 
causation, as opposed to association, among our variables. Nevertheless, we believe the results to 
be original not only for China but also more generally for poor countries, and to be sufficiently 
suggestive as to provide a road map for further research into the causal mechanisms. 
 
     2.  Background 
 
China is unusual among poor developing countries in that it is approaching universal basic 
education. The Law of Nine-Year Compulsory Education, passed in 1986, envisaged that all 
children would receive this minimum education, commonly 6 years of primary school and 3 
years of ‘middle’ (or ‘lower secondary’) school. For implementation, the country was divided 
into three areas. Cities and economically advanced areas (accounting for 25 % of the population) 
were to realise the 9-year target by 1990, areas of middle development (50 % of the population) 
by 1995, but no deadline was set for the economically backward areas (25 % of the population). 
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The implementation of the policy is decentralised. In the rural areas county governments have 
the responsibility to enforce the policy but township (corresponding to the former commune) 
governments actually carry it out. With economic reform, the fiscal system moved towards 
decentralisation and self-finance. The majority of government funding for rural education comes 
from the lowest levels (village, township and county). As fiscal pressures intensified with the 
decline in redistributive budgetary transfers, rural local authorities resorted to imposing a variety 
of user fees and charges. 
 
By law primary school is supposed to be free but in practice various fees have been levied: fees 
for tuition, for textbooks and for uniforms, and ‘financial contributions’ and other school-based 
fees or charges. On the basis of ability to pay, we expect to find lower user charges in poorer 
areas. On the basis of community revenue, however, we expect poorer areas to rely more heavily 
on user charges. There is likely to be great spatial variation, not only in the quantity but also in 
the quality of the provision of compulsory education. School quality has emerged as an 
important policy concern in rural China.  
 
Nearly all children attend their local primary school, normally located in their village, and it is 
common to attend a middle school outside the village but inside the township (normally 
comprising several villages). The quality of schooling varies greatly. At one end of the scale 
there is the ‘teaching point’ to be found in poor, small, remote localities. This is a one-room 
school house (often dilapidated) with a single teacher (often with no more than middle school 
education) instructing all children within walking distance. At the other extreme, schools in the 
wealthy rural areas may have well qualified teachers and be equipped with libraries, science 
laboratories, etc. 
 
A study (Liu et al, 2005) based on interviews with 800 primary- and middle-school principals in 
poor rural areas of Hebei Province in 2002/3 provides evidence that the quality of education is a 
serious problem. The average number of pupils per class was 49 in primary schools and 61 in 
middle schools, and in the latter 16% of classes had more than 75 pupils. The majority (53%) of 
teachers in primary schools had no more than 12 years of education and training, and 28% of 
middle school teachers were not qualified. No less than 45% of teachers in these schools were 
not being paid the full amount of their salary or were not being paid on time. The problem stems 
from the decentralised nature of the funding of compulsory education, which was also evident 
from their survey. Only 7% of funds came from central or provincial governments, 11% from 
county governments, 9% from township governments, and the remaining 73% from village 
revenues or tuition fees. 
 
At the post-compulsory level - the three years of high (or ‘senior secondary’) school – there 
tends to be educational rationing in rural areas. Pupils performing well in examinations can 
continue to high school, but only if they can afford to pay the school fees. The quality of high 
school education is in turn important for success in the competitive national examination that 
gives access to tertiary education and thence to the high income and urban life that college 
graduation normally offers. 
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Taken together, these institutional features suggest that poverty at both the household and the 
community levels can have an adverse effect on the quantity and also the quality of education 
that a child in rural China receives. 
 
The data set that we use is the rural component of the national household survey for China, 
relating to 2002, that was designed by an international team including the authors and organised 
and administered by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IE, 
CASS). In addition to the main ‘Rural Household Questionnaire’, there was an ‘Administrative 
Village Questionnaire’ and a ‘Social Network, Village Affairs and Living Quality’ 
Questionnaire. Both of these latter questionnaires contain questions that were introduced 
especially for our current purposes. 
 
3.  Literature review 
 
            Several research papers have explicitly examined the determinants or the consequences of school 
of enrolment in rural China. We summarise the most relevant briefly for the results that may help 
in the formulation of hypotheses given our particular research questions and data set. First, we 
examine the effects of poverty on education. 
  
  3.1 The determinants of enrolment 
 
            Knight and Li (1996) used the rural sub-sample of a 1988 national household survey to conduct a 
logit analysis of enrolment for the 14-19 age-group. They found significant coefficients on: male 
sex (positive), minority status (negative), (predicted) household income (positive, and large in 
effect), and province mean household income (positive, but small in effect). They posed the 
question: is rural education demand- or supply-constrained? A second logit, confined to the 
poorest quarter of households, introduced two new, and significant, variables: opportunity cost of 
education (negative) and rate of return to education (positive), both measured at the county level. 
This suggested that the educational decisions of poor households are predictable demand 
responses to economic incentives. In estimating the determinants of school fees, they found that 
province income per capita has a positive effect, suggesting that fees represent quality of 
education or that richer provinces offer higher rates of return to education, for instance because 
larger subsidies offer better opportunities for progress up the competitive educational ladder. The 
authors’ household income functions also showed the opportunity cost of education to rise and 
become important between the ages of 14 and 19.. 
 
Connelly and Zheng (2003) used a sample of microdata files from the 1990 population census to 
examine the determinants of enrolment of 10-18 year olds. Their data set is able to control for 
village fixed effects but lacks many of the plausible explanatory variables, including information 
on household income and any variables representing school quality. Their concentration is on 
primary school: their dependent variables are whether children attended primary school, or 
graduated from primary school. The variables that increased the probability of attendance or 
completion include: whether parents attended primary school, whether parents attended middle 
school, the village school attendance rate, and income per capita in the county (administratively 
gathered). The presence of siblings decreased girls’ chances of schooling. 
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Brown and Park (2002) specifically examined the effect of poverty on the educational enrolment 
and outcomes of children aged 5-16, using a 1997 survey of households and schools from poor 
counties in six provinces. Their measure of household wealth was expenditure per capita 
(excluding expenditure on education), and they defined a household to be ‘poor and credit-
constrained’ if it is in the bottom third of both expenditure per capita and access to credit. Using 
a proportional hazard model, they found that children are more likely to drop out of school if the 
household is poor and credit-constrained (their most important result), if they have fewer 
siblings, if the father has less education, if the mother had not taken the enrolment decision, and 
if school fees (possibly proxying school quality)are lower. The sibling result was interpreted as 
indicating that siblings are complementary rather  than competitors for resources, and the fees 
result as an indication that higher fees improve the quality of education and hence the rate of 
return. The authors found the test score (for enrolled pupils) to be higher if expenditure per 
capita is higher (implying that it improves quality), if there are older siblings, and for girls 
(suggesting that the less able girls drop out of school). However, their variables representing 
school quality (the pupil-teacher ratio, the proportion of rain-proof classrooms, and proportion of 
teachers with post-secondary education) had no significant effects on test scores. 
 
Appleton et al. (2006) use the rural sub-sample of a national household survey for 1995 to 
examine gender differences in educational enrolment rates and educational expenditures. 
Differences appear only beyond compulsory school age, and so the authors concentrate on the 
age group 15-18. They find gender differences in enrolment to be particularly pronounced in 
poorer households. The coefficient on household income per capita is positive and significant for 
girls but not for boys. This is interpreted as suggesting that girls’ schooling is a luxury good 
whereas boys’ is an investment good. Maternal education has a positive and significant effect on 
enrolment and on educational spending, whereas the effect of paternal education is weaker. The 
estimation of household income functions provided an economic explanation for the preferential 
treatment of boys: the coefficients on years of schooling indicate that the return to female 
education is not different from zero whereas the return to male education, although low, is 
significantly positive. 
 
De Brauw and Giles (2006) examine the effect of migrant opportunities on high school 
enrolment in rural China. They use a Ministry of Agriculture panel of households in 52 villages 
to predict high school enrolment with a set of household and village variables including the 
number of migrants from the village. This proves not to have a significant coefficient. However, 
it is plausible that migrant numbers are endogenous to enrolment, e.g. better roads and transport 
can increase both migration and enrolment, or an adverse income shock can increase migration 
but tighten credit constraints on enrolment. The panel provides an instrument for migrant 
numbers (years since the issue of national identity cards in the village) and the instrumented 
variable then yields a robust significant negative coefficient. The implication is that migrant 
opportunities, by raising the opportunity cost of schooling, deter high school enrolment. 
However, the study lacks good data, such as household income, which might indicate the effects 
of poverty on schooling. 
 
Gustafsson and Li (2004) used the rural sub-samples of the 1988 and 1995 national household 
surveys to measure the effect of educational expenditure on poverty. Mean real expenditure on 
education rose sharply across the deciles of household income per capita in both 1988 and 1995,   7
but especially in 1995, whereas household expenditure on education expressed as a proportion of 
income fell sharply across the deciles. Real expenditure on education increased rapidly over that 
period, and in 1995 it represented 3.6% of income for the sample as a whole but 7.3% for the 
poorest decile. Using the US$1 PPP poverty line, the headcount index of poverty in rural China 
fell by 2.2% points over the seven years, but with educational expenditures deducted from 
income, the fall was merely 0.6 % points. Indeed, the exclusion of educational expenditures 
made an even greater difference in the officially designated ‘poor counties’. 
 
3.2 The effects of education 
 
Secondly, we consider reverse causation in the relationship between education and poverty: the 
effects of education on income. Yang (2004) examined the contribution of education to rural 
incomes during the period of factor market liberalisation 1986-1995, when the relaxation of 
controls permitted households to reallocate resources from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities. Using panel data for Sichuan Province, he found that households with a better 
educated member responded to the new opportunities by devoting more labour and capital to 
non-agricultural activities that yielded higher returns, and that this contributed to the growth of 
their household incomes. Thus, the effect of education was indirect: it had no direct effect in the 
household profit function. 
 
A panel of rural households and workers for the years 1988-1996 was used to argue that 
education is becoming increasingly important as a determinant of opportunities and income 
(Zhang et al, 2002). At the first stage of the analysis, a logit analysis estimated the determinants 
of off-farm work. In 1988 the coefficients of the education variables were insignificant but the 
village dummy coefficients were important. By 1996 the education terms had become positive, 
significantly so, and substantial whereas villages had no reliable effect. At the second stage, the 
education terms were not significant as determinants of non-farm income in 1988, but they had 
become positive and significant by 1996. 
 
The way in which some Chinese villages get caught in poverty traps and some manage to escape 
is documented by Knight and Li (1997), who examined several villages in two counties of Hebei 
province. Villages which were close together geographically could nevertheless be far apart 
economically. The explanation provided was in terms of factor immobility and processes of 
cumulative causation. Although a good natural resource base helped to initiate the process, the 
main cause of differential village development was non-farm sources of income: migration and 
village industry. Both were constrained and the easing of constraints involved path-dependent 
cumulative processes. For instance, migration required a village network of information and 
contacts, and village industrialisation depended on the accumulation of local skills through a 
process of learning-by-doing and on the reinvestment of profits. The need for self-reliance meant 
that village expenditures on infrastructure and education depended heavily on the existence of 
non-farm activities in the village, but education could itself be important for generating non-farm 
activities.  
 
Knight and Song (2003, 2005, ch. 8) investigated Chinese peasant choices among three 
activities: farming, local non-farming and migration. Their source was a rural labour force 
survey conducted in 8 provinces in 1994. The picture they obtained was one of peasants having a   8
powerful economic incentive to diversify, or move entirely, out of agriculture but being 
constrained in various ways from doing so. The marginal return to non-farm labour – whether in 
local or migrant activities – are much higher than the very low marginal return on the farm. 
Moreover, workers who specialise in non-farm activities work many more days a year than 
specialist farmers, so enabling them to be more fully employed. Education sharply raises the 
probability of access to both non-farm activities, monotonically so in the case of village industry. 
These results suggest that education raises the incomes of rural people by improving their access 
to non-farm activities, in which conditional incomes are generally higher and in which the 
conditional returns to education are also higher. 
 
     4.   Theory and hypotheses: the vicious circle of poverty 
 
4.1 Poverty traps 
 
These research results suggest that we adopt the following theoretical framework and explore the 
following set of hypotheses using the rural sub-sample of the 2002 national household survey. 
Our basic hypothesis is that it is easy for households to be trapped in a vicious circle of poverty. 
Poverty itself can prevent them from grasping the economic opportunities and making the 
investments which could break the vicious circle and lift them out of poverty. A ‘poverty trap’ or 
‘low-level equilibrium trap’ can be a general phenomenon, associated with lack of savings and of 
access to credit, absence of productive social networks, scarcity of local economic opportunities, 
and the debilitating effects of a ‘culture of poverty’. For instance, Bowles et al. (2006) argue that 
there are many conditions that can trap individuals or groups in intractable poverty. These 
include the existence of critical thresholds, dysfunctional institutions, and neighbourhood effects, 
each of which can give rise to multiple equilibria. Similarly, Ray (2004), in discussing new 
research in development economics, concentrates on the potential for there to be more than one 
equilibrium, and for ‘bad’ equilibria – being socially inefficient although privately profitable - to 
perpetuate inequality and poverty: the task is then to find policies capable of tipping from one 
equilibrium to another. 
 
In this paper, however, we concentrate on the potential role of education – its absence or 
presence - in making or breaking the vicious circle of poverty. Postulating a vicious circle 
requires justification. There is some to be found in the literature. For instance, Galor and Zeira 
(1993) theorise that, given initial high inequality, liquidity constraints and set-up costs, it is 
possible that poor households will not invest in education, so locking their descendants into a 
poverty trap and perpetuating the inequality. Barham et al. (1995) develop a model in which 
households differ in their ability to accumulate human capital owing to their facing different 
rates of return to investment in education and having different capabilities to fund educational 
expenditures. They show that liquidity constraints can give rise to a poverty trap, in which able 
children remain uneducated and therefore poor. Durlauf (2006) argues that social interactions 
can explain persistent inequality across localities. For instance, an absence of role models in a 
poor locality causes children to develop lower labour market aspirations and thus lower 
educational aspirations. 
 
The following provides a theoretical framework. We distinguish effects that operate through the 
individual or the household, on the one hand, and the community, on the other. At the individual   9
or household level, educational enrolment can be constrained by lack of savings and by credit 
constraints. Household income, which would otherwise be irrelevant to a decision to invest in 
education, might therefore influence enrolment. The need for additional household current 
income might require that children work and thus raise the opportunity cost of enrolment. 
Poverty might reduce the prospective rate of return to education. There are several channels 
through which this can operate: ill-health, and physical and mental stunting, of the child; weak 
and unproductive social network to provide economic opportunities; limited productive assets 
with which to combine human capital; credit constraints which raise the cost of, and thus lower 
the return to, education; and risk aversion which requires a premium on the return to the 
investment. For various reasons, the education of parents might encourage the enrolment of their 
children: their own schooling experience might give the parents a ‘taste’ for education which 
then motivates their children; and they might impart out-of-school cognitive skills to their 
children, helping them to perform well at school. If uneducated parents are less successful in 
these matters, educational deprivation can be transmitted from one generation to another. 
 
  At the community level: the poverty of the community might mean that there is no local school, 
so raising the transport costs of school attendance or making it prohibitive. Inadequate 
community funding for education can reduce the quality of school provision, so decreasing its 
prospective rate of return. The rationing of places at post-compulsory levels of education implies 
that poor school quality at the compulsory levels might prevent access to the high rates of return 
further up the educational ladder, so deterring even compulsory school enrolment. The lack of 
local tax revenue can also, or alternatively, necessitate higher school fees being charged, so 
reducing the prospective rate of return or causing credit constraints to bind. There might also be 
a low rate of return to education generally in a poor community on account of a lack of local 
productive economic opportunities. A more general phenomenon, which envelopes these 
categories, is the ‘culture of poverty’ that can take hold in a poor community and which dulls 
supply initiatives and demand incentives. For instance, a low level of education in the 
community – whether among adults or children - can set a social norm for education and deter 
individual investment beyond the social norm. 
 
We start with an elementary illustration of a basic poverty trap involving just education, income 
and a credit constraint. Consider a simple model in which education in years (E) is a function of 
income (Y) and income in turn is a function of education. What are the conditions required for 
the existence both of low-level equilibrium poverty trap and also of a high-level equilibrium? 
Figure 1 illustrates. Assume that the education function E = E (Y,…) is inverse-S shaped to 
reflect the insensitivity of  education to income when income is low (the effect of binding wealth 
and credit constraints), its sensitivity over a range of income, and its dependence only on the rate 
of return to education when wealth and credit constraints become irrelevant. The income 
function Y = Y (E,…) can be linear, convex or concave without necessarily altering the analysis. 
In the figure we show it to be concave: income rises with education but at a diminishing rate. 
 
The equilibrium of E and Y at point a is locally stable: small divergences result in a move back to 
a. However, there is a second equilibrium at point b, which is locally unstable. Thus, an 
exogenous increase in education from E1 to a level less than E2 leads in time, through interaction 
between the functions, to a restoration of equilibrium: the ensuing rise in income is insufficient 
to sustain that level of education, and in due course both income and education decline to point   10
a. However, if education can be raised above the threshold, from E1 to a level beyond E2, 
interaction then raises both education and income. A third equilibrium is reached at point c, 
corresponding to education E3, which is stable on account of the declining sensitivity and 
eventual insensitivity of education to income. 
 
The other determinants of Y and of E may be such that some households face only one 
equilibrium. Thus, a sufficiently large vertical rise in Y = Y (E,…) – e.g. through investment in 
physical capital or an increase in product price - would confine a household to the high-level 
equilibrium, and a sufficiently large fall would confine it to the low-level equilibrium. Similarly, 
a sufficiently large vertical fall or rise in E = E (Y,…) – e.g. through improved access to credit or 
an increased subsidy of education, or their reverse, would have the same respective 
consequences. 
 
This very simple model is intended to illustrate two things. First, it is possible for a household to 
be stuck in a low-level poverty trap, involving both low education and low income. Second, there 
is a potential escape from poverty, at least for some households. A large enough intervention to 
raise education might go through the threshold and propel the household to another equilibrium 
involving higher levels of education and income. However, in reality, the forces creating vicious 
and virtuous circles are more complex than that and involve many more interdependent 
variables. 
 
4.2 The interdependent system 
 
      We set up a system of interdependent equations. They are not simultaneous equations in the 
sense that they are not all contemporaneously determined, involving as they do some 
relationships from one generation to another. They illustrate the nature of the vicious and 
virtuous circles that that generate a poverty trap or spring an escape from it. Where 
 
            EP        =   parental education 
            EC     =   community education 
            YC     =   community income 
            Y        =   income 
            EN     =   educational enrolment in years 
            EQ     =   educational quality 
            HE     =   health 
            HA     =   happiness 
 
  We have five equations, each dependent on some or all of the others. 
 
   Y       =   Y ( EN, EQ, HE )                                         (1) 
   EN    =   EN ( EP , EC , EQ, Y, YC , HE )                 (2) 
   EQ    =   EQ ( Y, YC  )                                 (3) 
   HE    =   HE ( Y, EN )                   (4) 
   HA    =   HA ( EN, Y, HE )                 (5) 
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  Figure 2 depicts the same set of relationships, labelling each one with an alphabetical letter. 
Consider first the direct and indirect determinants of education. At the household level, and 
within the same generation, there is a positive effect of adult health on household income (A), 
the positive effect of household income on adult health (B), and the positive effect of child health 
on enrolment (C). From one generation to the next, household income improves child health 
(again B), child enrolment (D) and also educational quality (E), and parental education 
encourages child enrolment (F). At the community level, within a generation, community 
income influences community enrolment (G), the quality of education being provided boosts the 
demand for enrolment (I), and enrolment at the community level may encourage enrolment at the 
individual level (J). Across generations, adult educational attainment in the community 
encourages child enrolment (again J), community income influences enrolment (K) and 
improves educational quality (L).  
 
      There are also outcomes of education, each operating on the generation being educated: 
educational enrolment of the child raises the income of the subsequent adult (M), educational 
quality also subsequently raises income (N), and educational enrolment subsequently improves 
the health of the person being educated (O). Happiness, normally referred to in the literature as 
subjective well-being or satisfaction with life, depends positively on education (P), income (Q), 
and health (R). 
 
      We intend in this paper to estimate as many of these relationships as possible. Our basic 
hypotheses are, first, that poverty at both the household and community levels adversely affects 
both the quantity and quality of education that children receive, and second, that the quantity and 
quality of education help to raise households out of poverty. We intend to explore the numerous 
education-related processes and mechanisms which can create a poverty trap and which can 
enable households to emerge from poverty. 
 
This set of hypotheses is already broad and ambitious. Nevertheless, it leaves out several 
mechanisms by which education can make or break the vicious circle of poverty. The social 
benefits of education can extend beyond the private economic returns. For instance, education 
can generate production externalities: the productivity of farm households can be raised by the 
education of other farmers in the locality (for instance, Weir and Knight 2004, Weir and Knight 
2006, for Ethiopia). However, such additional hypotheses fall beyond the scope of this research. 
   
4.   Descriptive information 
 
Primary school normally takes 6 years to complete, middle school 3 years, and high school 3 
years. No less than 84% of children in the sample were enrolled by the age of 7. We therefore 
take the age group 7-12 to be representative of primary school enrolment, 13-15 to correspond to 
middle school enrolment, and 16-18 to be relevant for high school. Table 1 shows the enrolment 
rates in these age groups, for boys, girls and total. We see that the primary school enrolment rate 
is remarkably high (at 95%), as is the middle school enrolment rate (90%). All but a small 
minority of children attend the compulsory years of school. Only in the non-compulsory high 
school years does the enrolment rate fall sharply (55%). 
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Nevertheless, Table 2 establishes that household income is important to schooling decisions. It 
uses the detailed information collected on 7-16 year-olds to contrast three categories of 15 and 
16 year-olds: those who did not complete their compulsory education, i.e., dropouts before the 
end of middle school; those who had completed compulsory education but were no longer in 
school; and those who had completed middle school and were currently in school (refer to the 
three groups as early dropouts, middle school graduates, and high school pupils). The table 
shows the five quintiles of households ranked by income per capita. If teenagers are enrolled in 
school, the household is liable to forgo income and thus its income may be lower. Because 
school enrolment can reduce household income, we simulate household income to correct for 
this effect, as will be explained in Section 6. Contrast the poorest households (the first quintile) 
with the richest (the fifth). Among the children in poor households, 48% were early dropouts, 
23% middle school graduates, and 29% high school pupils. The corresponding proportions for 
those in the richest households were 14%, 13%, and 74%. The ratios of early dropouts to high 
school pupils are very different: 1.65 and 0.18 respectively. The fourth row of Table 2 shows the 
enrolment rate of 15-18 year-olds (whatever their level of education). The rate rises 
monotonically, from 52% in the first quintile to 73% in the fifth quintile. 
 
In Table 3 we investigate whether household expenditure on each child in school varies with 
income. In the upper half of the table our criterion for classifying households into the bottom, 
middle and top thirds is household income per capita, and in the lower half our criterion is 
county income per capita, aggregated over all sampled households in the county. We see that 
both tuition fees and other educational spending (including that on uniforms and textbooks) vary 
greatly across the three household income groups, and that this is true of all three age groups. In 
the oldest age group (16-18) the ratio of the top to the bottom income group exceeds 2 to 1.  It is 
the same for both tuition fees and other educational expenditure. 
 
A further point to note from the table is the existence of large differences in expenditure per 
pupil according to age group. The ratio of expenditures in the age groups corresponding to 
primary, middle and high school are roughly 1 : 2 : 4. For instance, considering the poorest third 
of households, the ratios are 1 : 1.81 : 3.64 for tuition fees and 1 : 1.93 : 3.49 for total 
expenditures. The direct costs of schooling increase substantially as children enter middle school 
and again as they enter high school. 
 
      We expect average county income per capita to serve as a proxy for public expenditure per pupil. 
If that is the case, the amount that households need to spend might be higher in poorer counties. 
However, we see from Table 3 that, for household expenditure per pupil, the ratio of the richest 
to the poorest third of counties generally exceeds 2 to 1.  This gives us a strong hint - for further 
analysis below - that poor households, and also households in poor counties, suffer from poor 
quality education. 
 
Despite the large differences in household expenditure per pupil, the burden of educational 
expenditure on household budgets is actually greater for poorer households. The final row of 
Table 2 expresses total educational expenditure of the household as a percentage of (simulated) 
household income. We see that this falls almost monotonically, from no less than 26% in the 
poorest quintile to 7% in the richest. For the poorest quintile to have to pay a quarter of their 
income on education is indeed a burden.   13
 
              
 
5.  The determinants of enrolment 
 
Given that the enrolment rates are so high in the age groups relevant to compulsory education, 
the estimation of enrolment functions predicting enrolment at that level is not very informative. 
Instead, we show the activity status of children currently out of school (Table 4). The few 
children of primary school age who are not enrolled are mostly still waiting to attend school 
(33%) or not economically active (at least 40%). Among dropouts of middle school age, most (at 
least 59%) are not economically active, but a minority (24%) are working. No fewer than 72% of 
the dropouts of high school age are at work, but at least 15% are not economically active. Thus, 
by no means all dropouts find work, at least immediately, but at high school age the choice is 
largely between employment and enrolment. 
 
The general questionnaire of the rural survey gathered information on the education of all 
individuals, but the specially designed education module sought more detailed information on 
the education of children in the age group 7-16. Our analysis combines the two sources. 
Examining the children aged 15 or 16, there are three groups of interest: dropouts before the end 
of middle school, dropouts at the end of middle school, and those continuing after middle school. 
25% of those who had attended middle school had left school without completing, and of those 
children (here we can extend the age group to 15-18) who had completed middle school, 41% 
continued to be enrolled in high school. We pose two key questions. First, why do some children 
drop out of middle school before they complete their compulsory education? Second, why do 
some children continue into high school after they complete their compulsory education? 
 
A key variable in our various estimations is income. However, income may well be endogenous, 
either because it is partly determined jointly with enrolment (omitted variables) or because it is 
itself partly determined by enrolment (reverse causation). In order to measure the causal effects 
of income, it is necessary to simulate this variable or to instrument it. We use a measure of 
income which standardises for the loss of income that enrolment, with consequent withdrawal of 
labour, might cause: we calculate both farm and non-farm average hourly labour income at the 
county level, multiply these by the working hours of children of the relevant age group in the 
household, and subtract this sum from actual household income to get simulated income. This 
eliminates the difference in household income that is attributable to the greater hours worked by 
dropouts. Without such a correction, there is a danger that the coefficient of income in an 
enrolment function will be biased downwards. That is the most likely source of bias. However, it 
is also possible that parents work harder to fund the education of their children, in which case 
there can be upward bias. There is a case for instrumenting income in a way that corrects for 
both sorts of bias. The difficulty, however, lies in finding valid instruments, as nearly all the 
variables at our disposal might influence the opportunity cost of enrolment. After 
experimentation we chose to use the identifying variables reported in the notes to Table 6. 
Generally, however, we use simulated rather than instrumented income in our estimations. 
 
6.1 Explaining middle school drop-out 
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      The implementation of the compulsory education programme is dependent on the financial 
capacity of local governments. It is inevitable that the programme is more thwarted in the 
poorer areas. Even in the less poor areas, the rapidly rising tuition fees of recent years may 
prevent some children from completing compulsory education. Table 5 presents the results of 
a binary logit analysis estimating the determinants of premature dropping out from middle 
school. The dependent variable is equal to one if the child had not completed middle school 
and equal to zero for completion. For each independent variable it shows the coefficient and 
the marginal effect. Two specifications are shown, one with simulated ln income and the 
other with five simulated income quintile dummy variables, intended to explore non-
linearities in the effects of income. 
 
There are different ways in which to categorise the explanatory variables. One classification 
is according to demand-side, supply-side, and combined demand-and supply-side factors. 
However, given our interest in the role of poverty, we classify the determinants as poverty-
related at the household level, poverty-related at the community level, other household 
variables, and other community variables. 
 
Consider first the poverty-related household variables. Simulated ln household income per 
capita has a highly significant negative coefficient: income reduces the probability of 
dropping out early (column 1). The marginal effect implies that a fall in income by one 
standard deviation increases the probability of dropping out early by 4.3 percentage points. 
As the actual dropout rate is 21.2%, this represents an increase of 20.3%. However, in the 
alternative specification (column 2) we see that the relationship is non-linear: only the lowest 
income quintile has a coefficient significantly different from zero. The large positive 
coefficient implies that being in the poorest quintile of households (instead of in the middle 
quintile) increases the probability of dropping out early by 9.2 percentage points, or by 
43.4%.  
 
Whether the household perceives itself to be subject to a credit constraint is a second 
indicator of poverty. The coefficient on the variable indicating that the respondent’s 
household would not be able to borrow 5,000 yuan if it was urgently needed is positive but 
not quite significant. As lack of credit is often a concomitant of low income, we consider also 
their combined effect: an F-test (for column 1) shows that they are jointly significant at the 
2% level. An indicator of temporary poverty is provided by the household reporting a natural 
disaster in 2002. Entered as a dummy variable, it has a significantly positive coefficient: a 
recent spell of poverty increases the probability of premature dropping out by 5.5 percentage 
points (25.9%). Poverty is indeed an obstacle to the completion of compulsory education. 
 
Parental education is an indirect indicator of household poverty. The coefficients on years of 
schooling of both father and mother are negative, as expected, but the coefficient is 
significant only in the case of the mother. For instance, if the mother completed middle 
school instead of primary school, the probability of early dropout would be diminished by 3.6 
percentage points (17.0%) (column 1). Thus, the intergenerational transmission of 
educational outcomes may also perpetuate the poverty of a household. There can be sibling 
competition for educational resources within a resource-constrained household. We therefore   15
include the possession of a brother and of a sister as explanatory variables, but in neither 
specification are the coefficients significantly different from zero. 
 
We have four other individual or household variables. The coefficient on the dummy variable 
indicating that the child is in poor health is positive, as expected, and implies that poor health 
increases the probability of dropout substantially but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant, either because there are only 24 cases or because unhealthy children do not get as 
far even as middle school. We find unexpectedly that being male actually increases the 
chances of early withdrawal: by 6.1 percentage points (28.8%) (column 2). Self-assessment 
of performance at middle school is highly significant: those who reported that their 
performance was good had a probability of early dropout 18.7 percentage points (88.2%) 
lower (column 2). We examine below the determinants of middle school performance and 
find that it is weakened by poverty (Table 9). Finally, we introduce a dummy variable 
indicating that one or both parents are currently migrants. On the one hand, migrant parents 
might be a source of school fees but,on the other hand, schooling might be neglected if 
parents are absent. However, the coefficient has a different sign in the two specifications and 
is not at all significant. 
 
Consider how community-level variables affect early dropout from compulsory education. 
The main unit for analysis is the county (average population about half a million) as only ten 
households are sampled within each village – too few to provide reliable means.  The county 
(simulated) mean per capita income of sampled households has a positive but insignificant 
sign. County prosperity has two contradictory effects. On the one hand, local government is 
better able to subsidise compulsory education; on the other hand, local prosperity raises the 
opportunity cost of education for teenagers. If it is not a matter of chance, the positive 
coefficient implies that the latter effect prevails.  
 
Another possible indicator of the opportunity cost of middle school attendance is the 
migration density in the county: the proportion of workers who are working outside the 
county is likely to reduce the search and psychological costs of migration. The existence of 
migration opportunities can have two contradictory effects: it can encourage teenagers to 
leave school early in order to earn wages as migrants that are higher than they can get in the 
village, or it can encourage them to stay on at school because the returns to education in 
migrant employment may be greater than the returns to education in the village. The 
coefficient is significantly negative: a rise by one standard deviation in the proportion of 
migrants lowers the probability of early dropout by 3.2 percentage points (15.0%). This 
implies that the latter effect is the more important. As this variable might be endogenous, we 
use a valid instrument – farm land per capita – to predict migration intensity. However, the 
coefficient is barely altered, and the Wald test of exogeneity indicates that instrumenting is 
unnecessary.The distance between the household and the nearest middle school has a positive 
but slight and insignificant effect, possibly because this distance is typically small (mean 3.8 
kilometres). 
 
Certain counties are designated as ‘poor counties’ by central or province governments. 
Designated poor counties receive special funds from the national or provincial government to 
help them overcome their poverty. We introduced a dummy variable denoting that a county   16
was designated in that way, to find out whether this support helps to reduce dropout from 
middle school. In each case the coefficient is negative, as expected, but far from being 
significant; nor does its inclusion alter the coefficients on income. Designated poor counties 
are no different in the matter of early dropout from compulsory education. Fiscal support 
from the higher tiers of government does not appear to help them to achieve universal 
compulsory education. 
 
The equation contains two variables to proxy the quality of education in the county. One is 
the proportion of adults aged 25-34 in the county who had attended high school. The 
coefficient is negative and highly significant: a reduction of the proportion by one standard 
deviation raises the probability of early drop-out by 5.7 percentage points (26.7%) (column 
2). This rise may reflect the lower chances of progressing to high school when entry is more 
restricted or a lower quality of education being received. On average 45% of people reported 
dissatisfaction with the quality of secondary education in their county. The coefficient on the 
proportion expressing dissatisfaction in the county is positive, as expected, but not quite 
significant.. 
 
The theoretical concept for assessing the demand for education is the private rate of return to 
education. We estimated the return to a year of schooling at the community level. It was 
necessary to estimate the returns separately for farming (normally a household self-
employment activity) and non-farming (often an individual wage employment activity), but 
this was helpful as the estimated returns were distinctly different, with the returns being 
generally higher in non-farm (province mean 3.4%) than in farm activities (county mean 
1.2%). We estimated both returns at both the county and the province level. In the probit 
equations the variable for the returns in farming performed better at the county level and the 
variable for the returns in non-farming performed better at the province level. Thus, it 
appears that the relevant returns in farming are perceived to be those at the county level, 
whereas the relevant returns in non-farm activities relate to a larger area, the province, 
probably reflecting the greater mobility of non-farm labour. The rate of return to education 
may be important for those deciding whether to complete middle school. The coefficients on 
the return to a year of schooling in county farming and in province non-farming are both 
negative, as expected, but neither is statistically significant.  
 
Finally, we note the large and significantly negative coefficient on the county enrolment rate 
among 15-16 year-olds. A reduction in this enrolment rate by one standard deviation 
increases the probability of withdrawal from middle school by 6.2 percentage points, or by 
29.2% (column 2). The interpretation of this effect on individual enrolment is not 
straightforward (Manski 1993, Soeteven 2006). The problem is to identify the true 
relationship in the face of the ‘reflection’ problem – whether the mirror image causes a 
person’s behaviour or reflects it. The county enrolment rate may have an ‘endogenous’ social 
effect, i.e. a high enrolment of the reference group itself encourages individual enrolment by 
way of social norms or peer influences or bandwagon effects. The reverse of the coin is that 
in counties with a ‘culture of poverty’ the accepted social norm for education is low. The 
difficulty is to distinguish this effect from an ‘exogenous’ effect and a ‘correlated’ effect, 
both of which can also influence individual enrolment. An exogenous effect depends not 
directly on the enrolment but on the characteristics of the group, which may be such as to   17
encourage individual enrolment. A correlated effect arises if individuals enrol similarly 
because they have similar characteristics and face similar incentives to enrol. It is possible 
that the positive coefficient on the county enrolment rate is due to county characteristics that 
encourage the enrolment of individuals in the county and which are not included in the 
enrolment equation., e.g. because the county has a history of strong demand for, and hence 
supply of, education. 
 
6.2 Explaining high school continuation  
 
Our second exercise is to examine the determinants of the decision to enrol in high school 
after completion of middle school. For the binary logit analysis, among those 15-18 year-olds 
who have completed compulsory education, the group still enrolled is given a value of one 
and the group now out of school a value of zero. Table 6 reports the results, again with two 
specifications of the income variable. With minor exceptions the same set of explanatory 
variables is employed. Some of the results are very similar (allowing for the change in sign 
implicit in the dependent variable) but a few are different. 
 
Consider the variables representing poverty at the household level. Simulated ln income per 
capita again has a significantly positive coefficient: an increase by one standard deviation 
increases the probability of enrolment by 18.1 percentage points (column 1); recalling that 
the mean enrolment proportion is 45.8%, this represents an increase of 39.6%. The 
alternative use of (simulated) income quintiles again shows that children in the poorest 
quintile have significantly worse access to high school, although in this case the probability 
of enrolment increases monotonically across the quintiles (column 2). Thus, a child in the 
lowest quintile has a probability of being enrolled in high school  23.2 percentage points 
(50.8%) below, and one in the richest quintile a  probability 17.7 percentage points (38.6%) 
above, a child in the middle quintile. Moreover, if a household reports that it cannot raise a 
loan, there is a significant negative effect:  the probability of high school enrolment is 
reduced by 21.1 percentage points, or by 46.1% (column 1). Thus, the poor and credit-
constrained are at a huge disadvantage in gaining access to high school. 
 
The education of both parents has a positive and significant effect. Three extra years of 
schooling (corresponding to a rise in educational level from primary school to middle school, 
or from middle school to high school) for the father raises the probability of high school 
enrolment by 4.2 percentage points (9.2%), and for the mother by 3.0 percentage points 
(6.6%) (column 1). There is evidence that siblings compete for household resources: the 
coefficient on the presence of a brother is negative and significant, implying that the 
probability of continuing to high school is reduced by 7.2 percentage points (15.7%) 
(column1). 
 
Insofar as poverty affects performance at middle school, there is a further mechanism by 
which the poor are disadvantaged. A report of good performance has a positive and 
significant coefficient: the probability of continuing beyond middle school is raised by no 
less than 32.5 percentage points (71.0%) (column 1), reflecting the competitive nature of 
access to high school. As in the case of middle school dropout, the coefficient on poor health 
has the expected sign but it is not significantly different from zero. However, a more   18
stringent definition of ill-health, creating only 15 cases, does produce a significant and very 
substantial effect. 
 
There are some interesting contrasts between Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, against 
expectations, a boy was shown to be more likely than a girl to drop out of middle school. In 
Table 6 the significant positive coefficient indicates the opposite: a boy has a 5.6 percentage 
point (12.2%) higher probability of continuing to high school (column 1). Whereas having at 
least one migrant (away from the county) parent was not significant in the middle school 
equation, that coefficient is significant and positive in the high school equation, increasing 
the probability of enrolment by 12.2 percentage points (26.6%). Migrant remittances can be a 
source of funds for the payment of high school fees and charges; indeed, the need to make 
such payments might provide a motive for migration. 
 
We turn to the community influences on high school enrolment decisions. County ln income 
per capita has a significant negative coefficient: an increase by one standard deviation 
reduces the probability of high school enrolment by 13.3 percentage points (29.1%) (column 
1).  The migration density of the county has a significant positive sign: a rise by one standard 
deviation raises that probability by 4.3 percentage points (9.4%) (column 1). We again 
instrument migration density using farm land per capita in the county. In this case the Wald 
test of exogeneity is failed. For instance, there might be some unobserved variable, such as 
the ambition of local people, that explains both the dependent and the independent variable 
alike and masks a negative causal relationship. However, in both equations the effect of 
instrumenting is to raise the positive coefficient (e.g. from the reported 1.413*** in column 1 
to 2.522***). Whereas county income appears to proxy the opportunity cost of high school 
enrolment, the income prospect from migration opportunities does not perform that role. 
 
Considering the variables that might represent the quality of education, both the proportion of 
adults aged 25-34 who completed high school and the proportion of children at middle and 
high school who attend ‘key schools’ (schools that are given more public resources, charge 
higher fees, and  have competitive entry) have positive coefficients, as expected, but neither 
coefficient is significant. However, the coefficient on the mean level of high school fees in 
the county is positive, significant and important: a one standard deviation rise increases the 
probability of high school enrolment by 9.2 percentage points (20.1%) (column 2). We take 
this variable to represent the quality of high school education in the county, and its 
coefficient to represent the effect of quality on demand. Finally, the coefficient on the 
proportion of households in the county expressing discontent with the quality of secondary 
schools is significantly positive. This  surprising effect – the opposite of  the equivalent result 
in the equation for predicting middle school  drop-out  -  might reflect the high expectations 
of those whose children continue to high school and the likelihood that many respondents 
answer by reference to the local middle school whereas their children attend a more distant 
high school. 
 
The coefficient on the county rate of return to a year of education in farming is significantly 
positive. It implies that the probability of high school enrolment rises by 3.8 percentage 
points (8.3%) if the return rises by one standard deviation (column 2). The province rate of 
return in non-farm activities is also positive but not quite significant. These results suggest   19
that the private demand for high school education is responsive to the prospective returns. 
Finally, the coefficient on the county enrolment rate for 15-18 year-olds is significantly 
positive: a one standard deviation increase in that rate boosts an individual’s probability of 
high school enrolment by 16.5 percentage points (35.9%) (column 2). This is consistent with 
a bandwagon effect that can make or break an educational vicious circle, or with some 
unobserved factor influencing both dependent and independent variables, e.g. a county 
tradition of valuing education highly. 
 
We made an attempt to estimate the drop-out and continuation equations using instrumented 
income instead of simulated income. Unfortunately, estimation with necessarily weak 
instruments reduced the precision of the estimates and, in the full equation, the coefficients 
on income were no longer significant. Our solution was to estimate a restricted model, 
retaining only the explanatory variables that were less likely to be correlated with poverty so 
that the income variable would be the sole proxy for poverty. The results are shown in Table 
6. Poverty does indeed deter completion of middle school significantly: a fall in income by 
one standard deviation raises the probability of drop-out by 13.5 percentage points (57%) 
(column 1). Poverty also impedes continuation to high school: the same fall in income 
reduces the chances of continuing by 9.7 percentage points ( 21%) (column 2). In the 
estimations to come we generally use simulated rather than instrumented income. 
 
 
           7.     Further links in the circle of deprivation 
 
The foregoing analysis of the determinants of education suggests that there are further links 
in the vicious circle of poverty that deserve to be explored. Some of the variables that 
appeared to be important as determinants of enrolment in Section 6 do themselves need to be 
explained, so as to discover the underlying rather than the proximate determinants. In 
particular, we wish to explore whether poverty is a determinant of certain variables that do 
not themselves represent poverty. These include the county enrolment rate, performance in 
middle school, health status, the community rate of return to education, and the quality of 
education. 
 
7.1 Explaining the influence of community 
 
Given the importance of the county enrolment rate in encouraging individual enrolment, we 
explore the determinants of this variable, using information on the 122 counties in the 
sample. Table 7 has as the dependent variable the county enrolment rate of those aged 16-18, 
and as the independent variables a set of county characteristics. The county enrolment rate is 
positively influenced by the (simulated) income of the county. An income rise by one 
standard deviation increases the enrolment rate by 5.2 percentage points, i.e. by 9.2%. This 
result is consistent with households being credit-constrained and local governments being 
budget-constrained. The coefficients on the terms representing the return to a year of 
education in farming and in non-farming at the county and province level respectively are 
both positive, as expected, but not quite significant. An indication that the quality of county 
education is an inducement to enrolment is given by the positive and significant coefficient 
on the proportion of young adults who attended key schools: a rise by one standard deviation   20
increases the enrolment rate by 3.4 percentage points (6.0%). The argument that education 
begets more education is consistent with the positive and significant coefficient on the 
proportion of young adults who completed high school: a one standard deviation rise 
increases the enrolment rate by 4.7 percentage points (8.3%). The proportion of workers 
engaged in non-farm activities in the county appears to raise the enrolment rate but this effect 
could arise by chance. In summary, we conclude that the availability and quality of 
education, and the means to pay for it, are factors which underlie the county enrolment rate, 
which in turn plays an important role in determining household enrolment decisions. 
 
The theoretical criterion for the enrolment decision is the private rate of return to education. 
Non-farm activities are normally carried out on an individual basis whereas farm activities 
are normally carried out by households. Because this distinction requires different methods 
of estimation (as will be explained in Section 8), the returns are reported separately for farm 
and for non-farm activities. In any case, the annual returns at the county level are very 
different, averaging 1.4% in farming and 4.0% in non-farming. Table 8 reports the 
determinants of the county-level returns to a year of schooling. We see that mean household 
income per capita in the county has a significantly positive effect on the non-farm rate of 
return, possibly reflecting the greater productivity of human capital in a more developed local 
economy. Thus, it appears that the deterrent effect of mean county income per capita in the 
enrolment equations (Tables 4 and 5) reflects a high opportunity cost and not a low benefit of 
education. Taking the county mean value, household educational expenditure per capita has a 
significantly positive effect on the rate of return to education in farming. This suggests that 
the quality of education can be important in determining this rate of return, and it indicates a 
mechanism by which low quality of education can deter enrolment. Thus, the poor may be 
doubly disadvantaged. However, we cannot rule out reverse causation: a high rate of return 
may induce spending to improve educational quality; nor can we rule out the possibility that 
counties in which households spend little on education also suffer from a culture of poverty 
which deters complementary out-of-school human capital acquisition. Another indicator of 
educational  quality, the proportion of adults in the county who attended key schools, is not a 
significant determinant of either rate of return, possibly because the proportions attending 
key schools and also remaining in the county are too small. 
 
7.2 Explaining school performance 
 
Respondents were asked about their school performance relative to their peers when at 
middle school or, if they had not attended middle school, their performance when at primary 
school. We analyse the replies of children aged 13-18. Half of them (50%) reported that their 
performance was either good or very good. This group takes the value one, and the rest the 
value zero, in our binary logit analysis. Such a self-reported indicator may be inaccurate and 
also biased (few respondents owned up to a bad or very bad performance) but our estimates 
produce plausible and statistically significant results (Table 9). We see that gender has no 
significant effect on performance, but both father’s and mother’s years of schooling have a 
significant positive effect. For instance, if the father completed middle school instead of 
primary school, the probability of performing well rises by 5.1 percentage points, or by 10.2 
%. When ln simulated household income per capita is included as a proxy for parental 
support for the child’s education (column1), it has a positive and significant coefficient: a   21
one standard deviation rise in this variable increase the chances of performing well by 2.3 
percentage points, or by 4.6%. However, when the highly correlated variable, ln educational 
expenditure, is included as well, the income coefficient is not significant and it is the 
educational expenditure variable that does the work (column 2). In other words, income has 
its main effect through enabling parents to spend more on their child. The marginal effect for 
ln expenditure indicates that an increase by one standard deviation increases the probability 
of performing well by 5.6 percentage points, or by 11.2 %. The two variables with links to 
household poverty have significantly negative coefficients (column 1). A dummy variable 
indicating that the child works after school and another indicating that the child is not healthy 
reduce the probability of good performance by 4.1 and 19.7 percentage points respectively. 
 
7.3 Explaining the determinants of educational quality 
 
One important link is the role of educational quality. The enrolment functions contain 
explanatory variables that are serving as proxies for quality of education: these suggest that 
higher quality raises enrolment. However, the proxies are in turn influenced by the poverty of 
the household or the locality. The implication is that quality and quantity of education may 
interact positively, and that households can get stuck in a poverty trap because they 
experience both poorer quality and lesser quantity of education: the value of their human 
capital suffers in two ways. 
 
The quality of education that children receive can depend on the intensity with which they 
study. Moreover, children may need to study hard at primary and middle school if they are to 
succeed in the competition for entry to high school. If children from poor households are 
more likely to engage in work out of school, they may have less time for study and therefore 
may learn less and also have a smaller chance of securing a rationed high school place. This 
issue is explored in Table 10. We know whether certain activities are ‘always performed after 
school’: farmwork, childcare, and housework. The table reports binomial logit estimates for 
participation in these activities. We concentrate on the variables which are both relevant to 
the hypothesis and statistically significant. We see that (simulated) income significantly 
reduces the probability of both farmwork and housework. There is also a negative effect 
when at least one parent is a migrant, suggesting that parental migration has its effect more 
through remittances than by leaving children to cope with household tasks. The variables 
indicating the quality of the child’s school – school fee, and attendance at a key school – each 
significantly reduces both farmwork and housework. The same is true of the variables that 
proxy the general quality of education in the county – village educational expenditure 
aggregated to the county level, and the proportion of county students aged 15-18 attending 
key schools. The table also shows that at least two of the activities are more likely if the child 
is older, or a girl, or comes from a minority group, or has younger siblings. In summary, 
Table 10 suggests that the value of human capital received by poor children is adversely 
affected by out-of-school work in two ways. There is the direct effect of household poverty 
in reducing the amount of study time available, and the indirect effect which operates, at both 
household and county level, through the quality of schooling being received. Children lack 
the incentive to study hard if they cannot learn much at school, and if the prospect of 
continuing to high school is low. 
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We have information on whether there is a primary school in the village and on the nature of 
that primary school. We had expected to find that poor children are less likely than others to 
have a village primary school and more likely to have a single classroom school rather than a 
full grade primary school. However, the poorest quintile of households, and the poorest 
quintile of villages, are not at a disadvantage in these respects. In fact, the proportion of 
households in villages without a primary school is actually lower for the poorest quintile of 
villages (11%) than for the richest quintile (30%). However, this result is likely to reflect the 
latter’s willingness to travel for higher quality education, probably in larger, better resourced, 
schools. 
 
Even in rural areas, children can face a choice of schools of varying quality. Schools may 
charge different fees and involve variation in other costs, including transport costs, uniform 
costs, and costs of materials and books. Independently of the school, parents can choose to 
boost their child’s education by buying more books and paying for extra tuition and other 
extracurricular activities. The quality of education as opposed to mere school attendance may 
be important both for the value of human capital acquired in school and for the prospects of 
entering the generally competitive and rationed system beyond compulsory education. The 
amount that parents spend on education may thus have a powerful effect on future outcomes. 
 
One of the issues underlying the quality of education is whether private and public 
expenditures on education are substitutes or complements. For given enrolments, if 
educational quality is constant, more public funding implies less private funding: there is less 
need to charge school fees. By contrast, if quality is a variable to be optimised, greater public 
funding might encourage households to spend privately on education: the required condition 
is that government spending raises the marginal benefit of private spending. A third 
possibility is that both government and household spending are similarly influenced by a 
third factor such as local prosperity. For instance, if poor households are credit-constrained 
and local governments in poor counties are budget-constrained, poverty can depress 
educational quality. Higher incomes in a county might then enable both local governments 
and households to increase their educational spending so as to bring educational quality 
towards the optimum level, which is governed by the rate of return to quality-enhancing 
expenditure. 
 
We analyse the determinants of household educational expenditure per child, conditional on 
the child being enrolled. Table 11 reports the results of OLS equations in which ln 
educational expenditure for children at primary, middle, and high school are the dependent 
variables, concentrating on the explanatory variables that illuminate the relationships 
between poverty at the household and community levels and educational quality. The 
(simulated) income variable has significant positive coefficients at all three levels. Parental 
migration, plausibly reflecting disposable income in the form of cash remittances, also 
significantly increases the amount spent, but significantly so only at middle school. The older 
sibling variables reduce expenditure significantly at high school level, and the younger 
sibling variables do so at all three levels. This evidence of competition for household 
resources means that households are unable to spend as much as they would like on 
education. If households were not constrained, expenditure should reflect the rate of return to 
the investment and should not be influenced by the presence of siblings. A child’s attendance   23
at a key (secondary) school involves substantial and significant additional expenditure. There 
is a strong and significant positive coefficient on county income per capita and on county 
educational expenditure per capita, each coefficient rising monotonically with educational 
level. The former is a proxy for the capacity of local governments to pay for education and 
the latter a direct but crude measure of actual payment. These results indicate that household 
expenditure is complementary to local government expenditure on education, and not a 
substitute for it. The implication is that, if schools are of higher quality, parents are in turn 
willing to invest more in educational quality for their children. 
 
We can learn more about the nature of this complementarity, and of its relationship to 
poverty, by distinguishing between household expenditure on school fees and on other 
educational inputs: expenditure on books, on uniforms, and a residual input. The most 
important of these components is the residual, which is likely to include out-of-school 
tuition. Table 12 reproduces Table 11 but distinguishes between fee and non-fee expenditures 
and converts the dependent variables into logarithmic form so as to assist comparison of 
relative sensitivity. Note that total educational expenditure rises from 426 yuan per child at 
primary school, to 882 yuan at middle school, and to 2,566 yuan at high school, and that 
school fees represent 48, 46, and 49 % of the total respectively. An increase in simulated 
income by one standard deviation raises total educational expenditure per enrolled pupil by 
2.7, 3.7, and 4.3% at primary, middle, and high school level respectively. The household 
income variable is no less important for other expenditure than for tuition fees. Other 
expenditure appears to be more sensitive than tuition fees to an increase in county income per 
capita at the primary and middle school levels but less so at the high school level. Local 
government educational expenditure per capita has more influence on household spending on 
tuition fees than on other items in middle schools.  
 
In summary of Tables 11 and 12, household educational expenditure per child rises with 
income per capita of the household, income per capita of the county, and also the county 
average of local government educational expenditure per capita. This is generally true of both 
tuition fees and of other, more discretionary, educational expenses. It appears that household 
and community prosperity improve both the quality of education provided in the schools and 
the quality of additional educational support provided by the parents, and that greater 
subsidisation by local government is associated with more, rather than less, household 
expenditure on a child’s education. 
 
 
      8.     The effects of education 
 
A potentially important link in the circle of deprivation is whether, and to what extent, the 
outcomes of education are less favourable for the poor than for the less poor. This effect can 
operate both through the poorer quality of education that they receive and the poorer 
economic opportunities that they face. The main objective of this section is to examine the 
economic effects of education, concentrating  first on whether, and by what mechanisms, 
there are positive returns to education in rural China and, second, on whether household or 
community poverty reduces the prospective returns to investment in education. 
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8.1 Education and allocation of labour between farm and non-farm activities 
 
The descriptive Table 13 shows how workers are allocated between farming and non-farming 
activities and, within the latter, between local and migrant activities. We classify farm 
workers and non-farm workers according to which activity they spend more time in, and 
local non-farm and migrant workers according to whether they are working in the county. 
Our purpose is to contrast poor households, and young workers, with others. 
 
In the sample as a whole, we see that the farm/non-farm percentage division is 64/36, and the 
local/migration division of the 36% is 22/14. However, there is a marked difference between 
the poorest and the richest third of households: 75% of the former are in farming but only 
52% of the latter. There is little difference in the importance of migration but a large 
difference in the importance of local non-farm work: 12% and 34% respectively. A similar 
pattern is found in comparing the poorest and the richest third of counties, except that there is 
a larger difference in migration (favouring poorer counties), probably reflecting the role of 
migrant networks in fostering migration. We see again the heavy dependence on farming 
(73%) of the poorest half of households in the poorest half of counties. 
 
The relevance of age is seen in the row showing labour allocation among workers aged under 
30 years. Non-farm activities are much more important for the young (accounting for 49% of 
workers) than for the old, especially migrant labour (accounting for 30%). For workers under 
30 in the poorest half of households in the poorest half of counties, local non-farm 
opportunities are rare but migration is common (28% being migrants). 
 
A further indication that the distinction between farm and non-farm activities is important for 
income is provided by the association between household income per capita decile and the 
distribution of activities. The proportion of non-farm hours worked to total hours worked 
(equal to 37% overall) rises monotonically from 14% in the lowest decile to 65% in the 
highest (table not shown).  Table 14 illustrates the reasons why and how this powerful 
association arises. It shows that the ratio of the average return per hour of labour in non-farm 
to that in farm activities is 1.91. At the margin, the ratio is far higher, at 11.92. We also see 
that the ratio of the return per hour of labour in local non-farming to that in migration is 1.51 
on average and 1.37 at the margin. These disparities are consistent with there being labour 
market segmentation and rationing of non-farm jobs, as argued by Knight and Song (2005, 
ch.8). If so, does education assist households to earn non-farm income? 
 
Educational decisions are liable to be based on the prospects facing young people. They face 
a roughly equal division of labour between farm and non-farm activities, and even those in 
poverty have reasonable prospects of non-farm employment. The role of education in 
determining whether people engage in farming or non-farming, and the returns to education 
in farming and non-farming, are therefore important issues. We explore them in turn, the 
hypothesis being that education can have both allocative and efficiency income benefits. 
 
Table 15 reports the relevant results of a multinomial logit analysis to predict the 
determinants of activity choice, the reference activity being farming. Men are more likely 
than women to be found in both local and migratory non-farm activity. The propensity to   25
migrate falls with age but the chances of being in a local non-farm job initially rises with age. 
Being healthy is important for both activities but more so for migration. The proportion of 
workers in the county who are migrants and the proportion who work locally off-farm have 
predictable effects: the migration of others greatly increases the chances of own-migration, 
probably through network effects, and high non-farm labour density is a sign of local 
employment opportunities.  
 
Education raises the chances of being in either of the non-farm activities, but especially if it 
is local rather than outside the county. For instance, the marginals imply that high school 
rather than primary school completion increases the probability of migrant work by 33 
percentage points and of local non-farm work by no less than 64 percentage points. Thus, 
education is a lifeline for young people who wish to escape from the farm, whether their 
motive is economic or social. Very similar general results are obtained from equivalent 
analyses conducted on the sub-samples of workers in the poorest third of households and 
workers aged under 30. 
 
8.2 The economic benefits of education in farm and non-farm activities 
 
The benefits of education arise from two effects: an allocation affect and an efficiency effect. 
Our estimation strategy is as follows. It is necessary to instrument hours worked on account 
of its likely endogeneity: more hours may be worked if the returns are higher. We first 
estimate farm and non-farm working hours separately. A Tobit estimation is necessary owing 
to non-participation in an activity: the proportion of censored observations are 15 and 54% 
respectively for farm and non-farm work. The instrumented hours variable can then be 
included in the second-stage income functions which measure the benefits of education in 
farm and non-farm activities. 
 
Consider first the non-farm equation, based on data for individuals currently working but 
under 65 years of age. The key explanatory variables are the education categories, chosen 
rather than years of schooling so as to permit non-linearities and to assist policy analysis. We 
regress working hours also on self-rated health status, gender, age, age squared, and the 
county average hourly wage in farm and non-farm work. Table 16 presents the results: the 
coefficients, the marginals, and the decomposition of the marginals into that part due to 
change in the number of hours worked given positive non-farm hours and that part due to 
change in the probability of working off-farm. All the coefficients except age are highly 
significant. 
 
We concentrate on the explanatory variables that are relevant to our hypothesis. The mean 
value of non-farm hours worked is 732 hours per annum (14.1 hours a week). With no 
education as the omitted category, the education dummy coefficients are all positive and rise 
monotonically with education level. For instance, having high school instead of primary 
school education raises hours worked by 345 hours, two-thirds of this rise being due to the 
increased chance of participation. Education appears to encourage or enable workers both to 
participate in non-farm activities and also to work longer hours in them. A report of being in 
good health or very good health raises non-farm work by 109 hours. As expected, the county 
average non-farm wage raises hours worked and the corresponding farm wage lowers them,   26
hours decline throughout the working life, and men work longer hours than women.Two 
demographic variables, the number of children aged under 16 and the number of old people 
over 65 in the household, which should not influence household income directly, are 
included as instrumental variables so that instrumented hours can be included in the income 
equation to come. 
 
An equivalent estimation for farm hours worked by individuals is reported in Table 17. 
Again, the education dummies and the health variable are the most directly relevant. The 
equation differs only in that three household variables are added: the amount of farm land 
cultivated, productive fixed assets, and the total number of labourers on the farm. The mean 
value of the dependent variable is 956 hours per annum (18.4 hours a week) . All the 
coefficients except productive fixed assets (a poor proxy for specifically farm equipment) are 
highly significant. With no education again as the omitted category, the education dummy 
variables are all negative and rise monotonically in negative value. For instance, having high 
school instead of primary school education reduces hours worked on the farm by 110, two-
thirds of which is due to a lower probability of working on the farm. This is the most 
important result of Tables 16 and 17: as education increases, so workers switch strongly to 
non-farm work and weakly from farm work. This result indicates the allocative benefit of 
education. 
 
Reporting good health increases farm work by 30 hours. As expected, a higher county 
average non-farm wage, by raising the household’s supply price, reduces farm hours. We 
also include the predicted number of non-farm hours worked, as we expect non-farm work to 
be preferred if it can be obtained, and farm hours then to be adjusted. The coefficient is 
indeed significantly negative but its impact is small, the marginal having a value well under 
unity, suggesting that, with many rural households suffering from underemployment, non-
farm work can be expanded without contracting farm work equivalently or even 
substantially. Farm hours continue to increase with age until the mid-forties. 
 
Table 18 reports the determinants of the non-farm income of individuals. Our dependent 
variables are absolute non-farm income, to assist the simulations to come, and also ln non-
farm income. Consider column 2: income is higher for men than for women, and rises with 
age until the late forties. Being healthy raises income by 12%.The coefficients on the 
education dummy variables, beyond primary school, are large and highly significant, and rise 
monotonically with education level. In the absolute income equation (column 3), the 
differences in coefficients show the marginal product of each education level. For instance, 
the marginal product of middle school is 481 yuan and that of high school is 417 yuan per 
annum. However, this understates the value of education to a worker because education also 
increases the number of non-farm hours worked. When the hours variable is excluded from 
the specification, the marginal product of middle school becomes 835 yuan and of high 
school 781 yuan per annum (equation not shown). 
 
The first column of Table 18 introduces three proxies for the quality of education that 
workers had received, each measured at the county level: the proportion of young adults who 
completed high school, the mean level of school fees per pupil, and the proportion of 
households that expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of secondary education. Each   27
variable has the expected sign, and each is statistically significant when introduced singly. 
When they are entered together, they are jointly highly significant but, owing to their 
collinearity, only school fees remain significant. An increase in the county mean fee by one 
standard deviation raises non-farm income by 11.5%; and if all three variables are increased 
by one standard deviation, the gain is 22.0%.This suggests that the quality of education 
improves productivity in non-farm activities. 
 
Because farming is a household activity and a household contains workers of different 
educational levels, a different specification of the income function is required. In addition to 
farmland, productive fixed assets, and the proportion of household workers who are healthy, 
we include the number of (instrumented) farm hours worked by household workers at each 
educational level. The differences in the coefficients on these education-specific hours 
variables thus provide the marginal product per 1000 hours of each education level. 
 
Table 19 reports the results. As expected, farm land and productive fixed assets raise farm 
income. Poor health does not have an adverse effect, probably because there is plenty of 
underemployed household labour to draw on. All the education variables of interest are 
positive, highly significant, and rise with education level. The exception is college education: 
very few college graduates remain in the rural areas, and those who do remain are unlikely to 
farm except as a hobby. When we introduced the three county variables representing the 
quality of education that workers had received, as in Table 18, none proved to be significant 
(equation not shown). 
 
The marginal product, for 1,000 hours of farm work, of middle school is 44 yuan and of high 
school 26 yuan (column 2). To make these figures comparable with those for non-farm 
activities, we multiply up in the proportion 1,519 (the average number of non-farm hours 
worked) to 1,000: the marginal products become 67 and 40 yuan respectively Clearly, the 
marginal product of education in farming is much lower than in non-farming. There are 
efficiency benefits of education in both farm and non-farm activities but they are 
considerably greater in the latter. 
 
8.3 Simulating the effects on poverty of raising educational levels 
 
It is possible to make use of the estimates in Tables 17-19 to conduct a simulation analysis. 
The counterfactual question being posed is: what are the effects on the incidence of income 
poverty of improving the educational level of the rural labour force? We recognise that this is 
a simplistic exercise. We abstract form the long time lag between educational expansion and 
the consequent improvement in the income generation process, and from all the other 
relationships involving education and poverty for which this paper educes evidence. We also 
ignore the possibility that the intervention will alter the estimated relationships, e.g. by 
increasing competition for non-farm jobs among the educated, and the possibility that the 
economy will change before those being educated enter the labour market, e.g. by increasing 
the availability of non-farm jobs. 
 
We use two poverty lines, corresponding to the $1 a day and $2 a day concepts.  Converted 
into the 2002 prices in rural China, these become 925 yuan and 1,850 yuan. Table 20 shows   28
the results of this exercise. The first column reproduces the actual situation. It reports actual 
average farm income, non-farm income, other income and overall income. The mean 
numbers of farm and non-farm hours are also shown. Finally, it shows the actual proportion 
of rural households for which income per capita is under the $1 a day line (10.9%), and the 
proportion under the $2 a day line (43.0%). 
 
The first simulation is to assume that those with no education and those with primary 
education had completed middle school, i.e. compulsory education. The combination of the 
allocative and efficiency effects is to reduce ‘headcount’ poverty to 2.6% ($1 a day) and 
27.3% ($2 a day).Our other simulation is to assume that every worker with education below 
high school instead had completed high school. The poverty rates fall dramatically, to 0.5% 
($1 a day) and to 9.0% ($2 a day). These benefits stem from a reallocation of labour towards 
non-farm activities and the higher returns to education in such activities. 
 
8.4 Explaining differential returns to education 
 
The estimated returns to education in rural, or farming, activities in the developing world 
tend to be positive but low in absolute terms and in relation to the returns in urban, or non-
farming, activities. Phillips (1994) in a meta-analysis of the returns to education in farming in 
developing countries  - covering 30 studies and 59 data sets - estimated an average rate of 
return to an additional four years of schooling of 9.5%, implying an annual return  of 2.4%. 
In China, Li and Zhang (1998) found the returns to a year of education for farmers in Sichuan 
Province in 1990 to be 3.3% (average household education) or 2.7 % (highest household 
education).We shall show below our own estimates of the return in farming to be variously 
1.5% (all rural households, however little they farm), 3.2% (traditional farming households) 
and 4.8% (modern farming households) a year. The returns to education for farmers appear to 
be relatively low, both in China and more generally in poor countries. 
 
The returns to education can be lower for poorer households either because the quality of 
their education is inferior or because their opportunities or resources are inferior. These 
adverse effects can operate at the household level or at the community level. Poor households 
may be unable to afford high quality education and may be limited in their economic 
opportunities by lack of resources, of information, and of ambition. In poor counties the 
quality of educational provision may be low, local economic opportunities may be scarce, 
and the local resource base or infrastructure may be weak. We hypothesise that poor 
households, and households in poor counties, face lower returns to their education. 
 
Table 21 shows the estimated returns to a year of schooling in farming, non-farming and 
combined activities, distinguishing between different sub-samples according to household or 
county income per capita. It is not clear what education variable should be used in the case of 
household production because knowledge is in principle transferable and available within the 
household. After experimentation we decided to use the greatest years of education among 
the farm workers (for farm income) and among all workers (for combined income) in the 
household. Conditioning variables are kept to a minimum because of the possibility that 
education works partly through them. 
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In the sample as a whole the return to a year of education is much lower in farming (1.5%) 
than in non-farming (10.8%), and for household income as a whole (6.4%). The overall 
return corresponds to a weighted average of the two component returns, with the weight on 
non-farming rising with educational level (as was shown in Tables 15 and 16).  Including 
province dummy variables (and so estimating the within-province returns), the pattern is 
similar although in each case the return is a bit lower; we report only the equations which do 
not condition on province.  
 
Our interest is in the contrast between the average, the poor and the rich. The estimates of the 
returns to schooling for income-based sub-samples are subject to downward bias owing to 
truncation, but comparisons of the returns for the different income groups are valid. In all 
three cases, the return for the poorest third of households is lower than that for the richest 
third, being less than half in the farming and combined cases. For instance, the overall return 
to a year of education is a paltry 2.0% for the poorest third of households and 4.5% for the 
richest third. Poor households thus have less incentive than the non-poor to invest in 
education. Households in the bottom third of counties face distinctly lower returns in farming 
than do those in the top third. There are differences in returns both for poor households and 
for households in poor counties, suggesting that the problem must be addressed at both 
household and county levels. 
 
We search for the underlying reasons for the differential returns to education. The returns to 
education are likely to depend positively on the level of technology being used in the 
production process. Accordingly, they are likely to be greater not only in rural non-farming 
than in farming but also, within the latter, greater in ‘modernising’ farming conditions than in 
a ‘traditional’ farming environment. Argument in support of this hypothesis is to be found in 
e.g. Schultz (1975), and summary evidence in a meta-analysis which found an average return 
per year of schooling of 2.9% in modern farming and  of 1.9% in traditional farming 
(Phillips, 1994, p.155). 
 
We test the latter hypothesis in the following way. First, we identify ‘farming’ households. 
Our criterion is that the household derives the majority of its income from farm activities. 
Second, we distinguish between modern and traditional farming households on the basis of 
their relative emphasis on the traditional farm activity, grain production. Our necessarily 
crude definitions are that households which obtain the majority of their farm income from 
grain production are ‘traditional’ and those which obtain a minority are ‘modern’. We then 
estimate a farm income function, with three key explanatory variables: average years of 
education of the household workers, a ‘modern’ dummy variable, and a modern* years of 
education interaction term. The dependent variable is ln household farm income and the 
conditioning independent variables are land area used, hours of labour on the farm, and 
productive fixed assets. 
 
Table 22 reports the results. All the coefficients are significant. Being a modern farming 
household adds 33% to income, and the rate of return to a year of education is 4.2% (column 
1). However, when the modern* years of schooling interaction term is introduced (column 2), 
the coefficient on the interaction term is 2.1% per year. The implication is that the return to a 
year of schooling is 2.7% among traditional farmers and 4.8% among modern farmers. This   30
is powerful evidence that education is more valuable for farming households which are able 
and willing to diversify away from traditional crops.  
 
The subsequent analysis has shown that our simulation analysis of the effects of increasing 
education on poverty – being based on average relationships in the sample as a whole - may 
be misleading. Insofar as poor households face lower returns to education, the poverty gains 
will be overstated. Insofar as young people face better prospects of non-farm employment, 
the poverty gains will be understated. Accordingly, we redo the simulation analysis: first, for 
the poorest third of households and, secondly, for households of which the head is aged 
under 30 years. The results are different for two reasons. Not only are the values of the 
relevant characteristics of each sub-sample different from those of the sample as a whole, but 
also the equations are different. In both cases we re-estimate the equations in Tables 16-19 - 
on which the counterfactual simulation analysis is based - using only the sub-sample 
observations.  
 
Table 23 presents the results for the poorest third of households. The poverty rate is 
extremely high: 32% are below the $1 a day line and 100% below the $2 a day line. 
Assuming that all workers have completed at least compulsory education has a trivial effect 
on the poverty rate at the higher line but reduces the rate at the lower line by over a third.  
Giving all workers at least a high school education again has little effect on $2 a day poverty 
but reduces $1 a day poverty by almost two-thirds. Despite the poverty trap, the poorest can 
be helped out of their poverty by education. 
 
Table 24 reports the simulations for the sub-sample of young households. The baseline is 
quite similar to that for the sample as a whole: even though young individuals spend more 
time off the farm, their households actually work fewer non-farm hours. However, the 
simulated falls in their poverty rates are somewhat greater, reflecting the strong tendency for 
the educated young to find non-farm employment. 
 
8.5 Education, poverty and health 
 
Individuals were asked to classify themselves on a five-rung health ladder, from very healthy 
to very unhealthy. 84% reported being healthy or very healthy: we distinguish this group of 
adults aged 16-65 (taking a value of zero in the binary logit analysis) from the 16% whose 
health was so-so, bad, or very bad (taking a value of one). The explanatory variables are a 
dummy for male sex, age and age squared, a series of educational level dummies, and 
(instrumented) ln income per capita. All the variables predicting poor health have the 
expected sign and are significant at the 1% level (Table 25).  An individual is less likely to be 
unhealthy if he is male or young. The two variables of interest are the individual’s education 
and the household’s income. There is a significant fall in the chances of being unhealthy with 
educational level. For instance, having completed high school instead of middle school 
reduces that probability by 2.5 percentage points, i.e. by 14.4%; and an increase in household 
income per capita by one standard deviation reduces it by 1.1 percentage points, i.e. by 6.5%. 
Thus, both income-poverty and education-poverty induce ill-health in adults. A binary probit 
equation to predict ill-health among children aged 0-15 was unable to find links to the   31
poverty or the education of their parents: only male sex and age were significant, both 
reducing the probability of being unhealthy. 
 
8.6 Education, poverty and innovation 
 
Education may be important in fostering risk-taking behaviour in agriculture (Knight et al, 
2003), and poverty may itself foster a culture of poverty in which enterprise, risk-taking, and 
innovation are repressed. The survey contained a question asking the respondent about their 
attitude to adopting new agricultural technology. The answers ranged from very positive to 
not at all positive. We create a dummy variable for ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’ replies, the 
other three replies being the reference category. In a binary logit equation, the explanatory 
variables are male sex, age and age squared, and years of schooling of the respondent, and ln 
household income per capita. We consider the sub-sample of ‘farming’ households, i.e. with 
more than half of their income from farming. The hypothesis is that both the education and 
the income variables have positive coefficients. 
 
Table 26 shows this indeed to be the case. When ln household income per capita is used, the 
coefficient is positive and highly significant (0.251), and raising the income variable by one 
standard deviation increases it by 3.4 percentage points, or by 4.9% (equation not shown). 
However, causation is questionable. For instance, an inhospitable terrain may produce both 
poverty and a negative attitude. In the table we therefore instrument the income variable. The 
coefficient on income is reduced to 0.088 and it is no longer significant. Raising education 
from primary to high school increases the probability of having a positive attitude to 
innovation by 13.1 percentage points, or by 19.6%. This result, also, is open to criticism: 
more able people may be both more educated and more positive towards innovation. 
Correction of this potential bias would require a valid instrument for years of education. 
Nevertheless, the results of our attitudinal analysis suggest yet another link in the chain: low 
education and low income might be associated with the negative attitudes that are part of a 
‘culture of poverty’. 
 
8.7 Education, poverty and subjective well-being 
 
Our final exercise is to examine the relationship between our central variables education, 
income, and health and a variable that can be regarded as providing a broader criterion than 
any of these for assessing the quality of life: happiness or subjective well-being. We are 
encouraged in this exercise by the rapidly growing literature on the economics of happiness 
which generally finds powerful regularities – involving statistically significant coefficients 
with the hypothesised signs – in many data sets.  It is arguable that ‘subjective well-being 
poverty’ is an encompassing concept into which income poverty and capabilities poverty can 
be incorporated (Kingdon and Knight, 2006). Our hypotheses are that, in improving 
subjective well-being, education, income and good health all help to reduce poverty defined 
in this encompassing sense. Any definition of poverty involves a value judgement on the part 
of the researcher, and subjective well-being poverty at least has the virtues of being based on 
individual choice, of concern for subjectively perceived misery, and of measurability. 
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Survey respondents were asked how happy they were nowadays: very happy, happy, so-so, 
unhappy, or not at all happy. We convert this information into two forms of dependent 
variable, a binary variable  identifying those reporting themselves to be happy or very happy, 
and a cardinal variable ranging from very happy = 4 down to not at all happy = 0. The 
independent variables of most interest in our subjective well-being functions are the 
respondent’s years of schooling, a dummy variable indicating that the respondent reports 
being unhealthy, and ln income of the respondent’s household. The conditioning variables 
are whether the current living standard is reported to be lower, or higher, than five years ago, 
age and age squared, and dummies for male sex, marital status, and – to standardise for 
temporary effects - whether the respondent’s current mood is good. 
 
The choice of dependent variable makes no difference to the results, in line with the 
methodological conclusion of Ferrer-I-Carbonnel and Frijters (2004). In both cases all the 
relevant coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level (Table 27). The coefficient on 
years of schooling is positive. In the OLS equation, raising education from primary to high 
school increases the happiness score (mean value 2.68) by 0.036; in the logit equation it 
increases the probability of being happy or very happy by 3.0 percentage points, or by 4.8 %. 
This is of course in addition to the indirect effects of education on happiness via income and 
health. Insofar as causation runs from (past) education to (current) income and health, the full 
effect of education can be shown by omitting the latter variables. On their omission from the 
equation (not shown), the effect of education is more than doubled: additional education 
raises the happiness score by 0.114 and the probability of being happy by 7.1 percentage 
points, or by 11.4%.  
 
When ln household income per capita is included, its coefficient has a significant positive 
value in the OLS equation (not shown) of 0.177. However, because income is potentially 
endogenous, we instrument the income variable: the OLS coefficient rises to 0.278, again 
highly significant. It appears that some unobserved variable (such as a driven personality) 
adds to income but subtracts from happiness. An increase in ln income per capita by one 
standard deviation increases the happiness score by 0.127 and the probability of being happy 
by 7.4 percentage points, or by 11.9 %. Being in poor health decreases happiness by 0.237 
points and the probability of being happy by 13.7 percentage points, or by 22.0 %.  
 
The conditioning variables behave as expected: we see the importance of comparisons with 
previous living standards, implying that relative income is relevant as well as absolute 
income; and the importance also of standardising for current mood. Age has the commonly 
found U-shaped relationship with happiness; men report being less happy than do women, 
and marriage is good for happiness. The crucial results, however, are that education, income 
and health each has the hypothesised effect on subjective well-being. 
 
 
      9.      Summary 
 
9.1 The seventeen relationships 
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Our first objective in this section is to present the various results in a systemic way, showing 
that, on account of their many interactions, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.  
Only by considering all the relationships together can a coherent argument be developed. We 
take equations 1 – 5 and Figure 2 as our theoretical framework. Consider the evidence on 
each of the hypothesised relationships A,…, R in turn. 
 
A.  Being in good health raises the income of the individual and of the household. Self-
reported good health increases the number of hours worked by individuals in non-farm 
activities by 14.9% and in farm activities by 3.2% (Tables16 and 17). Standardising for hours 
worked, good health raises a worker’s non-farm income by 11.7% but has no significant 
effect on the household’s farm income (Tables 18 and 19). 
 
B. The logit equations predicting the health of an adult show that a one standard deviation 
fall in ln household income per capita raises the probability of being unhealthy by 1.1  
percentage points, or by 6.5% (Table 25). However, we lack evidence that parental poverty 
affects child health adversely. 
 
C. The logit equations predicting enrolment show that ill-health prejudices a child’s 
completion of middle school, increasing the chances of dropping out by 4.3 percentage 
points, or by 20.3% (Table 4), and of continuation to high school, the reduced chances in this 
case being 3.4 percentage points, or 7.5% (Table 5). However, neither effect is statistically 
significant, probably because there are few cases and because ill-health deters children from 
reaching even middle school. 
 
D. We have evidence that household poverty, as measured by income per capita and the 
existence of a credit constraint, has adverse effects both on completion of middle school and 
on continuation to high school. The logit equations predicting enrolment show that a one 
standard deviation decrease in ln household income per capita increases the probability of 
dropping out from middle school by 4.2 percentage points, or by 20.0% (Table 4), and 
decreases the probability of continuing to high school by 18.1 percentage points, or by 39.5 
% (Table 5). Our other indicator of poverty, suffering a credit constraint, reduces the chances 
of completing middle school (Table 4). The effect is not statistically significant but, given the 
close relation between poverty and lack of credit, our finding of their joint significance is 
relevant. Lack of credit significantly reduces the chances of continuation to high school, by 
19.1 percentage points, or by 39.6% (Table 5). 
 
E.  There is evidence that lower parental income means inferior educational quality for their 
children. We see this in Tables 11 and 12, where income per capita raises the total household 
expenditure per enrolled child, and where there is evidence of sibling competition for 
educational spending. An increase in household income by one standard deviation raises total 
household educational expenditure per enrolled child by 2.7, 3.7 and 4.3% at primary, 
middle, and high school respectively. Income poverty and sibling competition increases the 
amount of time that children spend in farmwork and housework after school (Table 10). 
 
      F.  There is also evidence that the education of children suffers if their parents are poorly    
educated.  The mother’s education significantly encourages completion of middle school: if   34
she has middle school instead of primary school education, the chances of dropout are 
reduced by 3.9 percentage points, or by 17.0% (Table 4). The education of each parent 
encourages continuation to high school: an additional three years of education for the father 
increases the chances of continuation by 4.2 percentage points, or by 9.2% (Table 5). 
 
G. We found evidence that community enrolment is positively related to community income. 
A rise by one standard deviation in county income per capita raises the county enrolment rate 
by 5.2 percentage points, or by 9.2% (Table 7). 
 
J. Community enrolment has a strong association with individual enrolment. A fall in the 
county relevant enrolment rate by one standard deviation reduces the chances of completing 
middle school by 6.4 percentage points, or by 30.2% (Table 4). The same fall reduces the 
chances of continuing to high school by 16.5 percentage points, or by 36.0% (Table 5). 
Whatever the mechanism by which this effect operates, educational poverty of the individual 
is closely linked to educational poverty in the community. 
 
K. Community income is a determinant of individual enrolment. In this case, however, the 
evidence runs counter to the hypothesis of a vicious circle of education- and income-poverty.  
Higher income in the county has no significant effect on the chances of completing middle 
school (Table 4). However, a fall by one standard deviation in county income per capita 
increases the chances of continuation to high school by 13.3 percentage points, or by 29.0%, 
suggesting that the opportunity cost of high school is lower in poorer counties (Table 5). 
 
L. The community also influences the quality of education that children receive. Some of the 
evidence on this is indirect and inconclusive, being based on differential returns to a year of 
schooling: a rise in county income per capita significantly raises the returns in non-farm 
activities and a rise in county educational expenditure per capita significantly raises the 
returns in farm activities (Table 8). There is a strong effect, at all three school levels, of 
household income per capita, county income per capita, and the county average of village 
educational expenditure per capita on the household’s expenditure per enrolled child (Tables 
11 and 12). Our interpretation is that households demand a higher quality of education, and 
are prepared to pay for it, as their own income rises and as the quality of publicly provided 
education improves. 
 
I. The quality of education that a child receives, or expects to receive, has an effect on 
enrolment. We know that school performance is raised by expenditure on a child’s schooling, 
which in turn is influenced by household income per capita (Table 9), and that school 
performance is a powerful determinant of enrolment. Reported good performance in middle 
(or primary) school decreases the probability of drop-out from middle school by 19.0 
percentage points (Table 4) and increases the probability of continuing to high school by 32.5 
percentage points (Table 5). The proportion of respondents in the county who are dissatisfied 
with the quality of secondary schools is significant in Table 4: a rise by one standard 
deviation in the proportion dissatisfied increases drop-out by 5.2 percentage points. Mean 
high school fees in the county appear to be irrelevant at middle school level but have a 
positive effect on enrolment at high school level. A rise by one standard deviation in county   35
high school fees – which we take to imply higher quality - raises the probability of high 
school enrolment by 9.2 percentage points (Table 5). 
 
M. Education is found to raise individual and household income.  It does so through an effect 
on hours worked and on the income per hour, in farm and non-farm activities.  The non-farm 
sector pays much better than does the farm sector, both on average and at the margin (Table 
14). A rise in the education of a worker from primary to high school level increases the 
number of hours worked in the non-farm sector by 47.1 % (Table 16), and reduces those 
worked in farm activities by 11.5% (Table17). Standardising for hours worked, the marginal 
products of high school and of middle school are 417 and 481 yuan respectively in non-
farming (Table18), and the corresponding marginal products are 40 and 67 yuan respectively 
in farming (Table 19). One of the ways in which education can raise income is by inculcating 
a positive attitude to innovation. Raising education from primary to high school level 
increases the probability of having a positive attitude to adopting new agricultural technology 
by 13.1 percentage points, or 19.6 % (Table 26). As against these benefits of education, the 
fact that the returns to schooling are lower for low-income households and low-income 
counties helps to create and maintain a poverty trap (Table 21). Similarly, the returns to 
schooling are lower for traditional farming households than for those engaged in ‘modern’ 
farming activities (Table 22). 
 
N. We have indirect evidence that the quality of education that workers have received is a 
determinant of its economic benefit and therefore of their income. One indication is the 
willingness of parents to spend more on the education of their children the higher is their own 
income per capita and the higher the income per capita, and the average village educational 
expenditure per capita, in the county (Tables 11 and 12). This suggests that parents perceive 
a benefit from improved educational quality. Moreover, if all three county variables that we 
take to proxy the quality of education that workers have received are together increased by 
one standard deviation, although farm income is unaffected, non-farm income is raised by 
22.0% (Table 18). 
 
O. Workers’ educational levels have an effect on their health status. Having completed high 
school instead of middle school, or middle school instead of primary school, reduces the 
probability of ill-health by 2.5 percentage points, or by 14.4% (Table 25). 
 
P. The logit equation predicting the determinants of subjective well-being imply that an   
increase in education from primary school to high school level directly raises the probability 
of being happy or very happy by 3.0 percentage points, or by 4.8 % (Table 27).  This increase 
is 7.1 percentage points, equivalent to11.4 %, if the indirect effects of education, working 
through its influence on income and health, are included as well. 
 
Q. The same equation shows the effect of income on subjective well-being to be powerful. 
An increase in ln income per capita of the household by one standard deviation raises the 
probability of the respondent’s being happy by 7.4 percentage points, or by 11.9 % (Table 
27). 
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 R. Finally, from the same source we see that poor health has a serious adverse effect on 
subjective well-being: it reduces the probability of being happy by 13.7 percentage points, or 
by 22.0 % (Table 27). Thus, given that subjective well-being is a criterion for poverty, we see 
that providing education, increasing income, and improving health can all reduce the risk of 
being in poverty. 
 
9.2  Can education break the vicious circle of poverty? 
 
We can now see why and how a poverty trap can exist. Low income restricts investment in 
education by households. Low education of the parents deters enrolment, as does low 
education in the community. Both low income and low education adversely affect health 
status; poor health status, in turn, reduces income and deters enrolment. Low income of the 
household and also of the community reduces the quality of education. Low quality of 
education in turn deters enrolment. Both low quantity and low quality of education reduce 
the income benefits of education. Low income, low education, and poor health all reduce 
subjective well-being, which can be viewed as an encompassing indication of poverty. Some 
of these relationships are short term but others are transmitted across generations, implying 
that household poverty can be persistent over the years. 
 
The interaction among the variables which has the potential to create a vicious circle also has 
the potential to create a virtuous circle, provided that a critical threshold can be surmounted. 
Using the simple analogy of Figure1, we see the following possibilities. There may be a 
single equilibrium at the (lower) point a, in which case the interactions simply move that 
equilibrium point upwards. There may instead be two stable equilibria, corresponding to 
points a and c, and an unstable equilibrium at point b.  The issue is whether a shock or 
intervention is sufficiently large to move the variables from the low-level equilibrium, a, 
beyond the critical threshold, b, so that they converge on the high-level equilibrium, c. We 
cannot tell from the evidence which of these cases is relevant. Nevertheless, consider four 
shocks or interventions.  
 
First, assume an exogenous shock which raises the household’s income. This has the 
potential to encourage enrolment and also to improve the quality of education demanded. 
Over a generation, these gains feed through into higher household income; this in turn 
improves health, which itself has knock-on effects on education and income. It also raises the 
quantity and quality of education of the next generation, with further indirect effects. 
Secondly, assume an exogenous shock that raises not only the income of the household but 
also that of its community. In addition to the consequences listed in the first example, there 
are benefits accruing from the greater public revenue of the community: higher quality of 
education, the possibility of a demonstration effect from a higher community enrolment rate, 
and the possibility of a higher rate of return to education as the structure of the local 
economy changes. By contrast, we also saw that the higher income of the community deters 
enrolment by raising the opportunity cost of school attendance. 
 
Thirdly, consider a policy intervention from above which is intended to improve the quantity 
and quality of education and is aimed at poor households. It will take time for the benefit 
from the educational improvement to flow, in the form of increased household income, but   37
eventually this rise will in turn improve health, with its beneficial effects, and also improve 
the quantity and quality of education received by the next generation. Fourthly, consider the 
same policy intervention, now aimed at poor communities. If all households in the 
community are targeted, in addition to the benefits accruing to each household described in 
the third case, there can be demonstration effects of the higher enrolment rate. If local 
governments are targeted, the intervention does not require the mediation of household 
demand to improve the quantity and quality of education supplied. 
 
Insofar as educational interventions raise income and ease credit constraints, on the one hand, 
and improve human capital, on the other, the ensuing increased access to funds for 
investment and enhanced profitability of investment may create further indirect effects 
through increased physical capital formation.  
 
       10.      Conclusions 
 
Section 9 has already provided a systemic summary of the paper. We draw three types of 
conclusion: first, concerning methodology and further research; second, on the relationships 
between education and poverty in a poor country, and how they throw light on the 
persistence of, and potential escape from, a poverty trap; third, on the implications of the 
research for policy in general and for rural China in particular.  
 
Most research papers in economics test one or two hypotheses: the research and its 
conclusions are specific and narrow. Broader conclusions might be drawn by introducing 
these research relationships into a more general system – by placing the results in the context 
of the research literature on related topics – but there is a natural reluctance to venture out in 
that way. 
 
In this paper we have taken a different approach. Our hypothesis is a very general one, which 
in turn gives rise to many sub-hypotheses, each of which requires empirical testing. In 
arguing the case we have had to adopt a broader, and therefore necessarily shallower, 
approach than is conventional in the research literature. The paper is also inevitably longer 
than is usual for journal articles. The trade-off is worth it because light cannot otherwise be 
thrown on an important general phenomenon viewed as a whole. Our combination of broad 
hypothesis and empirical estimation has not, to our knowledge, been previously attempted on 
this topic. 
 
The main lesson for research is the potential importance of educational quality – both for 
human capital formation and for the labour market benefits of education – and its relationship 
to poverty. Our findings suggest a need for further research on the causes and consequences 
of school quality. This in turn points to the use of tests of reasoning ability and cognitive 
achievement in the estimation of both educational achievement production functions and of 
human-capital-augmented income functions (an early example of which, for poor countries, 
was Boissiere et al., 1985). 
 
The main hypothesis of the paper is that there exist a set of relationships between income, or 
other indicators of poverty, and education. These run in two directions – from income to   38
education and from education to income – and they interact among themselves in many 
ways. The upshot is that these processes can generate reinforcing upward or downward 
pressures; in the latter case a vicious circle involving a low-level equilibrium for both 
education and income. 
 
No fewer than 17 hypothesised relationships A,…, R  were estimated, and then brought 
together in Section 9, where they were summarised individually and presented collectively to 
form a system. Given the inter-relatedness of the many variables in play, and the cross-
section nature of the data set, it is difficult to isolate causation, as opposed to association, in 
some of the relationships. However, that task is less important in the present context than 
establishing that there is an inter-related and mutually reinforcing system of relationships. 
This set of relationships constitutes our evidence that an education-poverty, income-poverty 
trap can exist. Unobserved heterogeneity can pose a problem for establishing causality, but if 
omitted but correlated variables such as lack of personal ‘ability’ or ‘a culture of poverty’ are 
themselves determinants of poverty, they simply strengthen the poverty trap.  
 
Causation becomes important for understanding the underlying reasons for the problem and 
for assessing the effects of policy interventions. Knowledge of the causal relationships is 
crucial in devising  policies that will engineer an escape from the poverty trap. For instance, 
in the absence of a good instrument for schooling, we cannot be sure that education will have 
the powerful effects on income that are implied by our estimates. For that, further, more 
detailed, research is required. An underlying policy issue is whether expanding educational 
enrolment alone would be sufficient or whether this should be accompanied by 
complementary policy interventions. These might aim to raise the prospective rate of return 
to education by, for instance, improving the quality of schooling, or improving opportunities 
in the local economy, or weakening a debilitating culture of poverty. 
 
Given a positive exogenous shock or policy intervention, there are two possibilities.  One is 
that the change may simply raise the position of the low-level equilibrium. The other is that 
interaction among the variables may set in train a process of cumulative causation and a 
virtuous circle generating a high-level equilibrium of both education and income. We cannot 
establish from our evidence that there are two equilibria and that a sufficiently large shock 
can move the system from one to another. Nevertheless, our findings of numerous positive 
relationships among a set of interacting variables opens that possibility. In any case, nothing 
in our general argument or policy implications hinges on the issue of whether there are two 
equilibria or just one, movable, equilibrium. 
 
The theory of a low-level equilibrium and the possibility of escape from it through a process 
of cumulative causation were pioneered fifty years ago (e.g. Leibenstein, 1957). Although 
never dormant, it has become popular again through endogenous growth theory, often 
involving human capital (e.g. Lucas, 1988, and applied to poverty by Azariadis, 2006) and 
the new emphasis on understanding persistent poverty (e.g. Ray, 2004, Bowles, 2006). This 
paper provides some empirical support – rather lacking in the literature – for the role of 
education in the persistence of, and potential escape from, a poverty trap. 
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We turn to the policy implications of our findings. The issue for the poor in rural China is not 
only the quantity but also - and probably more so - the quality of education. Recall that the 
enrolment rates for 7-12, 13-15, and 16-18 year-olds are 95, 90, and 55 % respectively. It is 
true that we found income and credit constraints to be important in determining dropout from 
middle school and continuation to high school. However, enrolment decisions are partly 
governed by the quality of schooling that has already been received and the quality that is 
expected. 
 
There are huge differences in expenditure on the education of a child, both by local 
governments and by households, and these differences are in turn closely related to 
community and household income. The household differences occur both in school fees and 
in other educational expenditure such as books, uniforms, and private tuition. The quality of 
education, much influenced by expenditure, has its effect not only on the demand side (by 
influencing the perceived rate of return to education) but also on the supply side (by 
determining which children succeed in the competition for high school places). Thus, even in 
countries where the quantity of education causes serious policy concern, the quality of 
education may deserve no less research- and policy-attention. 
 
Consider the policy implications for rural China. The underlying problem for people in poor 
households, poor villages, or poor counties is the degree of fiscal decentralisation to be found 
in rural society. Chinese peasants are effectively expected to ‘pull themselves up by their 
own bootstraps’. The solution to the education-poverty, income-poverty trap requires 
institutional reform: greater fiscal centralisation and equalisation – a theme that has already 
been stressed by the authors (Knight and Li, 1999). There should be more redistribution of 
tax revenue from higher to lower tiers of government, and from lower tiers of government to 
households. These redistributions should be aimed at the poor. 
 
The evidence suggests that the interventions should be made both at the household-level and 
at the local community-level. At the household-level, Chinese policy-makers might wish to 
introduce a version of the so-called Progresa scheme, pioneered in Mexico in 1997 and 
subsequently adopted in several other Latin American countries. An advantage of such 
schemes is that they lend themselves to experimental interventions designed to measure their 
effects accurately: the findings so far have been promising (Skoufias and McClafferty, 2001). 
 
The Progresa scheme is intended to address extreme poverty in rural areas of Mexico by 
developing the human capital of the poor. The recipients are poor families in poor 
communities. The scheme encourages school enrolment by providing conditional subsidies: 
it is necessary for parents to send their children to school. By contrast, in the Chinese 
conditions of high enrolment rates, such a scheme might well have its main effect on the 
quality of education that households demand; or if necessary the scheme could be adapted so 
as to promote the quality of education. The lower tiers of government could similarly receive 
conditional revenue transfers, the requirements of which would involve taking measures to 
improve the quality of education that local governments provide. 
 
The Chinese government has indeed begun to move in this direction. As part of the recently 
declared policy of promoting the ‘Harmonious Society’, the educational burden on rural   40
households has been progressively lightened. In 2001 the central government began to 
provide free textbooks for poor pupils attending compulsory education (years 1-9) in 
officially designated poor counties. In 2005 it introduced a policy of also exempting them 
from the payment of tuition fees and of providing them with accommodation subsidies. 
Government funding for exemption from tuition fees was extended to all pupils in western 
provinces in 2006 and to all provinces in 2007. Thus there are no longer tuition fees for 
compulsory education in rural China but measures to maintain and improve the quality of 
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Figure 2. Vicious and virtuous circles 
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Table 1 
 
Educational enrolments and expenditures by income per capita quintile  
 
 
                                                                    Income quintile                                                    Total 













Distribution of 15-16 year- 
olds by educational status 
(column percentage) 
         
  early dropouts  47.6  21.4  19.4  19.9  13.5  25.8 
  middle school graduates  23.5  20.7  23.1  15.1  12.8  19.2 
  high school pupils  28.8  57.9  57.5  65.1  73.7  55.0 
           














           
Educational expenditure as a 






















Notes:  1.  The categories excluded from the distribution of 15-16 year-olds are the 
negligible few who have never attended school and the children who are still 
enrolled in middle school: their choices will be made later. 
  2.  Simulated income rather than actual income is used throughout (see section 6). 
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Table 2 
 
Educational expenditure per child in school, in the bottom, middle and top third of households by 
household income per capita and by county income per capita, by age group 
 
 








ratio of top 
to bottom 
Age group 7-12         
        tuition  171.5  234.5  289.8  1.69 
        other  167.0  207.8  317.8  1.90 
        total expenditure  338.5  442.3  607.6  1.79 
        
Age group 13-15         
        tuition  310.2  405.5  551.1  1.78 
        other  344.2  410.1  538.9  1.57 
        total expenditure  654.4  815.4     1090.0  1.67 
        
Age group 16-18         
        tuition  623.8  975.1     1478.3  2.37 
        other  557.5  777.8     1254.6  2.25 
        total expenditure        1181.3      1752.9     2732.9  2.31 
 
        
  County income per capita 
 
        
Age group 7-12         
        tuition  152.8  232.3  327.8  2.14 
        other  156.6  197.2  334.5  2.14 
        total expenditure  309.4  429.5  662.3  2.14 
        
Age group 13-15         
        tuition  279.4  429.1  593.4  2.12 
        other  319.3  393.5  609.4  1.91 
        total expenditure  598.7  822.6     1202.8  2.01 
        
Age group 16-18         
        tuition  733.1  946.0     1466.0  2.00 
        other  583.2  770.8     1260.8  2.16 
        total expenditure        1316.3  1716.8     2726.8  2.07 
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Table 3 
 













Working   6.3               23.7  72.3 
Unemployed  29.1               19.7  10.2 
Disabled   4.0  1.8  1.0 
Pre-school 32.6  0.4 0.0 
Housework   1.1 6.6  4.5 
‘Dropout’  10.9                39.1  4.5 
Other 
 
26.9 8.7  7.5 
Observations 
 













coefficient        marginal 
 
       
simulated ln income per capita    -0.479*** -0.055     
simulated ln income per capita         
      quintile 1      0.698 *  0.092 
      quintile 2        -0.210       -0.023 
      quintile 3          0.000  0.000 
      quintile 4        -0.030      -0.003 
      quintile 5        -0.423      -0.044 
credit-constrained       1.031  0.165      1.076  0.174 
disaster in 2002    0.458**  0.055    0.451*        0.053 
father’s years of education    -0.011    -0.001    -0.014      -0.002 
mother’s years of education  -0.108**    -0.012    -0.114**  -0.013 
one or more brothers     0.080  0.009      0.117   0.013 
one or more sisters      0.071     0.008     0.085        0.010 
male     0.515**     0.058   0.545**   0.061 
good performance in middle school    -1.638***   -0.183   -1.695***  -0.187 
one or both parents a migrant      0.016  0.002    -0.009  -0.001 
county simulated ln mean income      0.611  0.070     0.519   0.059 
county migrant density   -2.244**    -0.257    -2.266**  -0.256 
distance to nearest middle school      0.026  0.003      0.024   0.003 
county proportion of adults 25-34 who 
   completed high school 
  -5.230*** -0.598    -5.493***  -0.621 
county proportion dissatisfied with  
   secondary schools 
0.406  0.046      0.356   0.040 
county rate of return in farming    -27.862     -3.186  -29.164  -3.297 
province rate of return in non-farming      -6.695  -0.765    -4.850  -0.548 
county enrolment rate for 15-16 year olds    -3.011*** -0.344    -3.041***  -0.344 
designated poor county  -0.210  -0.023    -0.266  -0.028 
ill-health  0.287  0.036      0.196  0.024 
intercept       1.686        1.649   
       
mean of dependent variable  0.212    0.212   
pseudo  R-squared  0.254  0.256   
number of observations   631     631   
 
   52
 
Notes: 1.  We use simulated rather than instrumented income; the latter has a similar but 
slightly smaller coefficient on ln income per capita and has less statistical 
significance. 
 
  2.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the county level.  53
Table 5 
 





    ___________________ 




coefficient        marginal 
 
      
simulated ln income per capita  0.775*** 0.191    
simulated ln income per capita   
      quintile 1    -1.003***  -0.232
      quintile 2    -0.068  -0.017
      quintile 3      0.000  0.000
      quintile 4      0.356**  0.088
      quintile 5     0.715***  0.177
credit-constrained       -0.967**  - 0.211   -0.912**  -0.202
father’s years of schooling      0.057*       0.014    0.064**  0.016
mother’s years of schooling      0.040*       0.010    0.042*  0.010
one or more brothers      -0.293**   -0.072   -0.281*  -0.069
one or more sisters         -0.168      -0.041   -0.157  -0.039
good performance in middle school  1.362***      0.325    1.362***  0.325
male       0.229**       0.056  0.240**  0.059
one or both parents a migrant  0.489***   0.122    0.490***  0.122
county ln simulated mean income       -1.128***  -0.278   -1.028***  -0.254
county migration density      1.408**      0.347    1.333***  0.329
county proportion of adults 25-34 who 
  completed high-school 
       1.197  0.295    0.988  0.244
county proportion of children in key  
  schools 
       0.599  0.148    0.460  0.113
county mean school fees  2.166*** 0.534    2.257***  0.557
county proportion dissatisfied with  
   secondary schools 
0.461*** 0.114    0.450***  0.111
county rate of return in farming        15.195**  3.744 15.524**  3.830
province rate of return in non-farming         5.759  1.419 5.446  1.344
county enrolment rate for15-18 year 
olds 
   3.840*** 0.946 3.799***  0.937
designated poor county       -0.029       -0.007   0.025  0.006
ill-health  
intercept 
     -0.141 
     -6.312*** 
    -0.034 -0.092 
-5.887*** 
         -0.023 
      
mean of dependent variable      0.458     0.458   
pseudo R-squared      0.250     0.243   
number of observations  1,822    1,822   
 
Notes: As for Table 4.  54
Table 6 
 
The determinants of drop-out from middle school and the continuation to high school, restricted 
model with income instrumented 
                                                                        drop-out                                          continuation 
                                                            _______________________      _____________________ 
                                                                  coefficient      marginal         coefficient       marginal 
 
income (instrumented)     -0.656**  -0.202    0.385**    0.148 
good performance in middle school     -0.838***  -0.244    0.811***    0.307 
male      0.020    0.006    0.119**    0.046   
county rate of return in farming    -8.154  -2.506  13.611***    5.222 
intercept       0.231     -1.168***   
Wald chi-sq    85.58    264.97   
number of observations       753                        2262   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: 1.  The Stata program ivprobit maximum likelihood is used. 
  2.  The identifying variables in the income equation are: whether the village leader 
has experience of running a business, whether the village had to sell grain at the 
officially specified price in 2002, and whether the terrain of the village is plain 
(the reference category), hilly or mountainous. All four variables have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. 
  3.  The test of over-identifying instruments (indicating that if one instrument is valid 
then at least one other instrument is also valid) is passed in the continuation but 
not in the drop-out equation. In both equations, the Wald test of exogeneity 
indicates that we cannot reject the hypotheses that income is exogenous.   55
Table 7 
 
The determinants of the county enrolment rate for those aged 16-18, OLS estimates 
 
 
Simulated county income per capita  
 
    0.040** 
 
   0.054*** 
Return to a year of education in farming in the county      1.958      2.154 
Return to a year of education in non-farming in the province       1.286      1.552* 
Proportion of pupils 16-18 in the county who attend key schools      0.905**      1.136*** 
Proportion of adults 25-34 in the county who completed  
      high school 
    0.482**   
Proportion of the labour force in the county who are in local  
      non-farming 
    0.160      0.191 
Constant term      0.236***      0.243*** 
    
Adjusted R-squared      0.336      0.276 
Mean of dependent variable      0.563      0.563 




Note:                ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the one per cent, five per cent and 
ten per cent levels respectively. 
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Table 8 
 









household income per capita in county 
 
    0.000 
 
    0.005*** 
 household educational expenditure per capita in county       0.225**      0.132 
county proportion of adults aged 25-34 who attended key schools      0.009     -0.004 
intercept      0.011***      0.026*** 
    
mean value of dependent variable      0.014      0.040 
adjusted R-squared       0.037      0.053 
number of observations  122  122 
    
 
Notes:  1. County educational expenditure is village educational expenditure per capita with         
weighted aggregation to the county level. 
2.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.   57
Table 9 
 





     











   -0.055 
 
    -0.048 
 
  -0.014 
 
 -0.012 
Father’s years of schooling  0.068***      -0.061*** 0.017   0.015 
Mother’s years of schooling  0.059***       0.048***  0.015   0.012 
Ln simulated household income per 
capita 
     0.121**       0.046  0.030   0.012 
Ln expenditure on child’s schooling         0.231***     0.058 
 
Child works after school      -0.165**      -0.088    -0.041  -0.022 
Child not in good health  -0.826***      -0.844***   -0.197  -0.200 
Constant term  -1.685***      -2.589***    
        
Pseudo- R-squared        0.028        0.027     
Mean of dependent variable        0.504        0.500     




Notes:     1.   The dependent variable is (self-reported) excellent or good performance at middle 
school (or, if middle school was not attended, at primary school) = 1. 
     2.   The dummy variable for work is child does farmwork or housework after school 
during school terms = 1, and the dummy variable for health is child’s health is so-so, 
bad, or very bad = 1. 
      3.    ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the one, five and ten per cent level  
      respectively.   58
Table 10 
 
Logit model indicating that a child always performs certain activities after school: 
children aged 6-16 
 
 








Simulated income per capita         -0.005***        0.000  -0.005*** 
at least one parent a migrant         -0.026*       -0.019**       -0.016 
attendance at key school        -0.060***       -0.017  -0.100*** 
school fee (000 yuan)        -0.029***       -0.003  -0.031*** 
age (years)          0.024***    -0.004***   0.024*** 
male  0.010    -0.024***  -0.068*** 
minority group       0.100***         0.008    0.154*** 
younger sibling at school       0.039***      0.020***  0.085*** 
younger sibling not at school   0.032*      0.266***        0.017 
county educational expenditure per capita    -0.986**         0.300       -3.656***  
county proportion of pupils aged 15-18 
in key schools 
      -0.018       -0.030  -0.144*** 
intercept  0.026     0.151***       -0.008 
      
mean value of dependent variable  0.226        0.074        0.352 
pseudo R-squared  0.055        0.133        0.095 
number of observations   6333  6294  6328 
      
 
Notes:  1.  The dependent variable is ‘always performs farmwork after school’ = 1; and 
equivalently for childcare and for housework. 
2.  The county educational expenditure per capita variable is created by aggregating 
village educational expenditure per capita to the county level. 
3.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
4.  Other variables in the equations but not reported are older sibling working, older 
sibling not working, older sibling not in school, father’s schooling, mother’s 
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Table 11 
 
The determinants of total household expenditure per enrolled child at primary, middle 













ln simulated income per capita  
 
      0.011*** 
 
       0.039*** 
 
     0.035*** 
      
at least one parent a migrant         0.017         0.099**       0.277 
older sibling working      -0.011         0.002      -0.525*** 
older sibling at school       -0.046***        -0.017      -0.396* 
younger sibling at school      -0.030***        -0.092***      -0.402*** 
younger sibling not at school      -0.055***        -0.044      -0.668* 
attendance at key school           0.699***       0.622*** 
minority group      -0.103***       -0.296***       0.010 
distance to closest middle school (km)           0.019***       0.047*** 
county income per capita        0.111***         0.167***       0.668*** 
county educational expenditure per 
capita  
      1.336***         5.197***     15.884** 
county proportion of pupils 15-18 in key schools      -0.022         0.223*       1.049 
      
intercept         0.379***         0.483**       1.355*** 
      
mean value of dependent variable (000 yuan)         0.426         0.882        2.566 
adjusted R-squared         0.252         0.152        0.261 
number of observations  3,643  2,555    683 
      
 
Notes:  1.   ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
2.  Other variables in the equations but not reported are male, credit constraint applies, 
and county enrolment rate.   60
Table 12 
 
The sensitivity of household educational expenditure components to household income 











ln total expenditure per child     
       simulated household income   0.015***   0.018***   0.017** 
       county income per capita  .0.060***   0.068***   0.125*** 
       educational expenditure by local  
       government  
 0.178   1.163**   2.665* 
     
ln tuition fee per child     
       simulated household income   0.053***   0.019   0.015 
       county income per capita   0.120***   0.083**   0.168*** 
       educational expenditure by local  
       government  
-0.981   5.485*   5.229 
     
ln other expenditure per child     
       simulated household income   0.060***   0.031**   0.013 
       county income per capita   0.130***   0.120***   0.111** 
       educational expenditure by local  
       government  
 2.219   2.465   5.664 
      
      
 
Notes:  1.  Simulated income is income minus income earned by children in the relevant age 
group (primary 7-12, middle 13-15, high school 16-18 years). County income per 
capita is the average household income per capita of all sampled households in the 
county. Educational expenditure by local government is the average village per 
capita expenditure on education aggregated to the county level. 
2.  The OLS estimates contain all the explanatory variables of Table 12, but only the 
coefficients of the three variables of most interest are reported. 
3.  Since the dependent variables are in logarithmic form, the coefficients represent the 
percentage increase in expenditure attributable to a unit increase in each explanatory 
variable. 




Labour allocation of workers among farm, local non-farm, and migration activities: row 
percentages  
 
 Farming  Non-farming 
______________________________ 

















poorest third of households  75.0  11.7  13.3  25.0      114 
richest third of households  51.7  33.8  14.5  48.3  43 
poorest third of counties  71.4  12.4  16.2  28.6  131 
richest third of counties  54.0  33.8  12.2  46.0   36 
poorest half of households in 









workers aged under 30  51.1  18.6  30.4  48.9  163 
workers aged under 30 in 
poorest half of households in 













          
 
Note:  The criterion for classification between farm and non-farm activity is the predominant 
  number of hours worked, and between local non-farming and migration whether the  
  worker is in or out of the county.   62
Table 14 
 








  Marginal returns 
                 (1)                     (2) 
            ___________________ 
farming 1.44  0.012  0.017 
non-farming 





                 migration  2.04    0.122 
ratio of non-farming to farming  1.91          11.92   
ratio of local non-farming to migration  1.51        1.37 
      
 
Notes:  1.  The marginal returns per hour are based on income functions which contain 
productive fixed assets and farmland as well as hours worked in the different 
activities as the explanatory variables 
  2.  All the coefficients in the income functions are significant at the 1% level.   63
Table 15 
 
The determinants of activity choice among farming, local non-farming and migration: 
multinomial logit analysis 
 
 



















age           0.084***   0.013   -0.021  -0.003 
age squared          -0.001***   -0.0002   -0.001***    -0.0001 
college            1.811***   0.355   0.997***   0.025 
professional school           1.583***   0.291   1.072***   0.046 
high school           0.900***   0.146   0.680***   0.037 
middle school           0.657***   0.090   0.528***   0.029 
primary school           0.263***   0.035   0.346***   0.023 
healthy           0.174***  0.020   0.407***   0.025 
farm land (mu)         -0.053***  -0.007  -0.048***  -0.003 
county migration density          2.266***   0.198   9.565***   0.672 
county non-farm labour density          5.674***   0.796   3.326***   0.162 
intercept         -5.263***    -3.044***   
pseudo R-squared     0.284       
mean value of dependent variables     0.221       
number of observations 
 
22,220      
 
Notes:  1.  The activities farming, local non-farming and migration are defined in Table 14. 
Farming is the reference activity (with coefficients equal to zero). 
  2.  Several explanatory variables were included in the specification but are not 
reported in the table, including whether the worker has children, has army 
experience, has suffered a national disaster in the previous year, lives in an 
officially designated poverty county, etc. 
  3.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.   64
Table 16 
 
















    1099.45***  503.61
 
171.76 331.85
age  17.30**      7.92     2.70      5.22
age squared    -0.61***    -0.28   -0.10    -0.19
healthy        237.34***  108.71   37.08   71.63
county farm wage        -37.79***  -17.31   -5.90  -11.41
county non-farm wage   74.95***   34.33  11.71   22.62
college    1,412.63***  647.06 220.68  426.38
professional school    1,370.90***  627.95 214.16  413.78
high school    1,038.34***  475.61 162.21  313.40
middle school        724.69***  331.95 113.21  218.74
primary school       284.99***  130.54 44.52    86.02
number of children under 16       -57.30***  -26.25 -8.95  -17.29
number of elderly over 65       -45.87  -21.01 -7.17  -13.84
intercept -2,264.48***       
        
mean value of dependent variable       731.74       
pseudo R–squared           0.021       
number of observations  22,172       
number of uncensored observations  10,156       
        
 
Notes:  1.  The McDonald-Moffitt decomposition is conducted to separate the change in non-
farm hours worked into that part due to change in the number of non-farm hours 
worked (if positive) and that part due to change in the probability of working non-
farm hours (if zero). 
  2.  The sample comprises all persons who are currently working and aged under 65 
years. 
   65
Table 17 
 
















age 92.39*** 78.72 50.96  28.28
age squared  -0.10*** -0.85 -0.55  -0.31
healthy         35.49**    30.24 19.53  10.84
farm land (mu)  8.56*** 7.29 4.71  2.61
productive fixed assets (000 yuan)  10.81*** 9.21 5.92  3.29
number of workers  -37.03*** -31.55 -20.30  -11.26
predicted non-farm hours  -0.46*** -0.40 -0.25  -0.14
county non-farm wage  -16.36*** -13.94 -8.98  -4.98
college -488.48*** -416.22 -267.50  -148.46
professional school  -399.48*** -340.39 -218.74  -121.40
high school  -158.80*** -135.30 -87.05  -48.31
middle school  -133.98*** -114.16 -73.44  -40.76
primary school          -29.27  -24.94 -15.99  -8.87
number of children under 16  26.65*** 22.71 14.35  7.96
number of elderly over 65            17.45  14.87 6.31  3.50
intercept  -380.30***    
     
mean value of dependent variable     955.71       
pseudo R–squared     0.034       
number of observations  22,172       
number of uncensored observations   18,892       
       
 
Notes: as for Table 16.  66
                                                     Table 18  
 
                  The determinants of non-farm income of individuals, OLS estimates 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
       ln non-farm  
income 
         ln non-farm   
income          
absolute non farm 
income (yuan) 
 
male        0.140***  0.086***  305.1***
age        0.053***  0.058***  223.8***
age squared       -0.0006***  -0.0006***  -2.37***
healthy        0.108**  0.111***             213.2* 
non-farm hours (instrumented)        0.078***  0.082***  218.0***
college        0.600***  0.734***  4214.0***
professional school        0.425***  0.548***  1986.9***
high school        0.235***  0.319***  1003.0***
middle school        0.173***  0.233***  585.9***
primary school        0.059            0.078           105.3 
intercept        4.780***  4.849***  -5,413.4***
county proportion of adults 25-34 
who completed high school 
      0.856   
county mean school fees        0.772*** 
county proportion dissatisfied with 
secondary schools 
      -0.244 
mean of dependent variable        7.628             7.628  3,780 
adjusted R-squared        0.434             0.416                0.274 
number of observations  9,513           9,513  9,513 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
             Notes:    1.The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the county level. 
                            2.  ***,  **,  and  * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
                            3. The test for joint significance of the three variables representing quality of education in 













farm land (mu) 
 
0.042*** 245.8***
productive fixed assets   0.041***  257.3***
proportion of workers healthy            -0.024         54.1   
(instrumented) hours worked by members with:     
college                0.029*         79.9 
professional school  0.047***  272.7***
high school  0.037***  167.8***
middle school  0.031***  141.4***
primary school  0.028***  97.0***
no education  0.017***           19.3* 
intercept 7.548***  2,255.0***
  
mean of dependent variable              8.161  5,375.8 
adjusted R-squared             0.183             0.215 
number of observations            8,603         8,603 
  
 
Notes:  1.  Farm land is measured in mu, productive fixed assets in 000 yuan, and hours 
worked in 000 hours. 
  2.  Hours worked are instrumented using the equation reported in Table 17. 




Simulation analysis: the effects on measures of income poverty of improving the education of the 
labour force  
 










         1,206 
 
1,174 
average non-farm income  1,017            1,411  2,069 
average other income     432               432     432 
average overall income  2,592            3,050  3,675 
average farm hours     649               608    564 
average non-farm hours     458               555    700 
poverty rate (%):       
      $1 a day         10.9  2.5           0.4 
      $2 a day         43.0  27.0           8.4 
      
 
Notes:  1.  The simulations are based on the equations reported in Tables 16-19. 
  2.  The first simulation assumes that workers without education or only primary 
school are raised to middle school completion. The second assumes that all 
workers with less education are raised to high school completion. 
  3.  The $1 and £2 a day criteria are converted into 2002 prices in rural China: 925 
yuan and 1,850 yuan respectively.     69
Table 21 
 














   0.015*** 
 
   0.108*** 
 
0.064*** 
      
poorest third of households     0.006     0.060***  0.020*** 
richest third of households  0.017**     0.081***  0.045*** 
      
poorest third of counties     0.005     0.086***  0.047*** 
richest third of counties     0.019*     0.068***  0.064*** 
      
poorest half of households in poorest half of counties     0.008     0.070***  0.033*** 
richest half of households in richest half of counties     0.021***     0.079***  0.054*** 
      
 
Notes:  1.  The non-farm equations use individual data and the farm and combined equations 
use household data. 
  2.  In the farm equations the dependent variable is ln household farm income per 
capita and the explanatory variables are maximum years of education among 
workers engaged in farming, maximum age among workers engaged in farming 
and its square, cultivated land (mu) and ln productive fixed assets. The inclusion of 
the variable input, farm hours, makes very little difference to the estimates of 
returns. 
  3.  In the non-farm equations the dependent variable is ln individual income and the 
explanatory variables are years of education, age and age squared. When ln non-
farm hours is included the coefficients all fall, reflecting education’s influence on 
the probability and extent of non-farm work. 
  4.  In the combined equations the dependent variable is ln household income per 
capita and the explanatory variables are maximum years of schooling among 
workers in the household, maximum age among workers in the household, ln 
cultivated land (mu), and ln productive fixed assets. 
5.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
   respectively.  70
Table 22 
 











average years of schooling 
 
    0.042*** 
 
     0.027*** 
modern      0.284***     0.140** 
modern * average years of schooling              0.021** 
land (mu)      0.023***       0.023*** 
ln productive fixed assets (000 yuan)         0.019**         0.019*** 
intercept      7.978***       8.084*** 
   
mean of dependent variable         8.719            8.719 
adjusted R-squared         0.169            0.170 
number of observations  4,719     4,719 
    
 
Notes:  1.  ‘Farming households’ are those that derive a majority of their income from farm 
activities. 
  2.  ‘Modern farming households’ are those that derive a majority of their farm income 
from grain production. 
  3.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively 
  4.  The dependent variable is ln household farm income. 
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Table 23 
 
Simulation analysis for the poorest third of households: the effects on measures of income 











average farm income              769 
 
           718 
 
                   698 
average non-farm income              334             443                   596 
average other income                85               85                    85 
average overall income           1,072          1,247               1,379 
average farm hours              682             635                  613 
average non-farm hours              262             324                  410 
poverty rate (%)   
    $1 a day  32.5 21.1  11.7
    $2 a day  100.0 96.7  92.2
      
 
Notes:  As for Table 20, except that the simulations are based on the specifications reported in 
Table 16-19 but estimated for the sub-sample of households in the lowest third of 
household income per capita.   72
Table 24 
 
Simulation analysis for households with heads aged under 30 years: the effects on measures of 











average farm income            1,158 
 
         1,078 
 
                   950 
average non-farm income              637           1,282               2,387 
average other income              440              440                   440 
average overall income           2,145          2,800               3,777 
average farm hours              663             663                  513 
average non-farm hours              321             397                  567 
poverty rate (%)   
    $1 a day  16.8                  1.8                         0.4
    $2 a day                   52.6                 24.7                         5.2
      
 
Notes:  As for Table 20, except that the simulations are based on the specifications reported in 
Table 16-19 but estimated for the sub-sample of households for which the household 
head is aged under 30 years.   73
Table 25 
 





















    0.5273 
 
0.4993 
age in years    0.058***   0.0067      38.21      15.25 
age squared       0.00002***   0.0000  1692.61  1296.24 
years of schooling  -0.072***  -0.0083      7.0926  2.9733 
predicted ln income per capita  -0.192***  -0.0222      7.7706  0.5076 
intercept -1.978***         
        
pseudo R-squared           0.1518       
proportion unhealthy         17.38       
number of observations  28,729       
        
 
Notes:  1.  The dependent variable takes a value of one if the respondent reports being so-so, 
unhealthy or very unhealthy, and of zero if healthy or very healthy. 
2.  The omitted category in the dummy variable analysis is female. 
3.  *** denotes significance at the one per cent level. 
4.  Very similar results were obtained from an ordered probit estimation using all five  
  categories of health status. 




The determinants of a positive attitude towards new agricultural technology:  













     0.082 
 
0.017 
age              0.074*** 0.015 
age squared  -0.0008*** -0.0002 
years of schooling              0.110*** 0.023 
ln household income per capita               0.088*** 0.018 
intercept            -2.167***   
      
mean of dependent variable               70.00   
pseudo R-squared        0.019   
number of observations       4,725   
      
 
Notes:  1.  The means and standard deviations of years of schooling are 6.935 and 2.506, and 
those of ln household income per capita are 8.888 and 0.651 respectively. 
        2.      ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels     
respectively. 
        3.    Ln household income per capita is instrumented using productive fixed assets, land,  
average years of schooling of household workers, number of farm hours worked, 
number of non-farm hours worked, number of household members, whether the 
terrain is mountainous, hilly, or plain, and a set of province dummy variables. 
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Table 27 
 






happy or very happy 
________________________ 
 








years of schooling  
  
      0.020** 
 
      0.005 
 
      0.006** 
ln income per capita (instrumented)    0.703***       0.162         0.278*** 
poor health    -0.573***     -0.137        -0.237*** 
current living standard higher     0.742***       0.173         0.307*** 
current living standard lower    -0.357***     -0.085        -0.256*** 
age       -0.016      -0.004        -0.012** 
age squared           0.0003*         0.0001    0.0002***
male    -0.165***     -0.038        -0.061*** 
married    0.487***            0.117         0.260*** 
good mood    1.286***       0.301         0.506*** 
intercept     -6.464***     -0.023 
        
mean of dependent variable      0.622     2.681 
pseudo/adjusted R-squared            0.142             0.212 
number of observations     8,861      8,861 
  
 
Notes:  1.  The dependent variable is happy or very happy = 1, so-so, unhappy, or not at all 
happy = 0 (estimated using binary logit), or a cardinal variable with very happy = 
4, happy = 3, so-so = 2, unhappy = 1, not so happy = 0 (estimated using OLS). 
  2.  The independent variables include dummies for current living standard which is 
higher than five years ago, and current living standard which is lower than five 
years ago, with the omitted category being current living standard the same; self-
reported poor health, with other replies being the omitted category; and self-
reported good mood, with other replies being the omitted category. 
  3.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
  4.    Ln household income per capita is instrumented using productive fixed assets, land,   
         average years of schooling of household workers, number of farm hours worked, 
number of non-farm hours worked, number of household members, whether the 
terrain is mountainous, hilly or plain, and a set of province dummy variables 
 